Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations

University Graduate School

5-15-2020

An Economic Assessment of the Impacts of Outdoor Water Use
Restrictions in South Florida
Lara Kiesau
Florida International University, lkies001@fiu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd
Part of the Natural Resource Economics Commons, Natural Resources and Conservation Commons,
Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons, and the Water Resource Management Commons

Recommended Citation
Kiesau, Lara, "An Economic Assessment of the Impacts of Outdoor Water Use Restrictions in South
Florida" (2020). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 4524.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/4524

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the University Graduate School at FIU Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of FIU
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Miami, Florida

AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF
OUTDOOR WATER USE RESTRICTIONS IN SOUTH FLORIDA

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
in
ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES
by
Lara Kiesau
2020

To:

Dean Michael R. Heithaus
College of Arts, Sciences and Education

This thesis, written by Lara Kiesau, and entitled An Economic Assessment of the Impacts
of Outdoor Water Use Restrictions in South Florida, having been approved in respect to
style and intellectual content, is referred to you for judgment.
We have read this thesis and recommend that it be approved.
_______________________________________
Mahadev G. Bhat

_______________________________________
Michael C. Sukop

_______________________________________
Pallab Mozumder, Major Professor
Date of Defense: May 15, 2020
The thesis of Lara Kiesau is approved.

_______________________________________
Dean Miachel R. Heithaus
College of Arts, Sciences and Education

_______________________________________
Andrés G. Gil
Vice President for Research and Economic Development
and Dean of the University Graduate School

Florida International University, 2020

ii

DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to my husband John W. Baron and to my parents Petra and
Michael Kiesau. Johnny, you were the reason why I came to Miami, to FIU to complete
my master’s degree. Meeting you was the greatest coincidence I could have ever
imagined and coming to Miami to be able to live with you smoothed the path for us to
become the funny, loving, strong and thankful couple that we are today. You always
support me and offer your help. Without you I would not be where I am today.
Furthermore, I am so thankful to my parents who have been supporting me my entire
life. Thanks to your help I was able to continue my life and studies so far away from
home. You are always there for me, with words and deeds, to make my ideas come true
and accomplish the goals I set for myself. Thank you so much! I love you all!

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my major advisor Dr. Pallab Mozumder for his guidance and
scholarly support through the course of my graduate career. I am very grateful for the
uncountable hours he spent to share his knowledge with me and gave me direction.
Furthermore, I am sincerely thankful for the encouragement and advice provided by the
members of my graduate committee, Dr. Michael Sukop and Dr. Mahadev Bhat over the
course of this thesis research. I would like to thank the South Florida Water
Management District, in particular Richard Marella, Mark Elsner, James Harmon, Calvin
Neidrauer and Dr. Jayantha Obeysekera who would always answer my questions as
detailed as possible and provide me with informative material. Furthermore, I am
thankful for the friendly and supportive help provided by Dr. Assefa Melesse, the
Graduate Program Director. Finally, I would like to express my gratitude towards Mrs.
Excell for her support and kindness during my time at FIU.

iv

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACTS OF
OUTDOOR WATER USE RESTRICTIONS IN SOUTH FLORIDA
by
Lara Kiesau
Florida International University, 2020
Miami, Florida
Professor Pallab Mozumder, Major Professor
Population growth and climate change are important factors determining residential
water demand. Most residential water consumption can be attributed to outdoor use. To
reduce water consumption, outdoor water use restrictions (OWRs) have become a
popular policy tool in the last decades. We developed an integrated framework
consisting of a Difference-in-Differences (DID) analysis, Value Function approach and
Stated Preference Study to perform an economic assessment of the impacts of OWRs in
South Florida. The results reveal a usage reduction of up to 133 gallons per person per
month due to the strictest OWR, equaling a yearly value of US$26.6-US$54.4 million for
South Florida residents. To link with the regional hydrological system, we estimate that a
volumetric decrease of 0.9 million acre-feet in Lake Okeechobee could be related to the
implementation of this OWR. The findings deliver beneficial information for policy
decisions regarding the economic and societal implications of OWRs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The scarcity of freshwater is becoming more frequent and more severe
worldwide than at any point in human history. South Florida is one of the affected
regions with various factors influencing the increasing water stress. Despite the region’s
tropical climate with a defined rainy season over the summer months, drought events
are becoming common, such as the 2006/07 drought (NIDIS National Integrated Drought
Information System, 2020). During the 2006-07 drought, it rained 25% less than the
average during the winter months, leading to more than 57% of the state experiencing
some degree of drought in the subsequent spring (Di Liberto, 2017). Additionally, the
temperatures were much higher than usual, making that winter the second hottest since
1895 (Di Liberto, 2017).
Residential water demand is especially high in urbanized areas with high
population densities. High water demand can be partially attributed to the rate of water
usage in private residences, which amounts to more than 300 gallons of water per day
for the average American family (US EPA, 2018). At least 30% of the household
consumption occurs outdoors, even a bigger proportion in dry parts of the country, and is
used for watering lawns and gardens (US EPA, 2018). Therefore, outdoor water use is
responsible for the largest proportion of residential water use in the U.S. (Argo, 2016).
As a consequence, conditions such as rising temperatures and decreased or changing
precipitation can, in combination with a high and varying consumption, result in
increased pressure on freshwater supply (Environmental Protection Agency & Program,
2013) in the Biscayne aquifer. The Biscayne aquifer is the main source of drinking water
in South Florida (Miami-Dade County, 2018), and is part of the regional water
management system including the Kissimmee Basin, Lake Okeechobee and the
Everglades (SFWMD, 2018). About 8.7 million people spread over 16 counties depend
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on this water system for daily supply (SFWMD, 2019c). Therefore, not only climate
change but also growth-related issues, especially in the Miami metropolitan area, need
to be considered in water management decisions. One of the pressing issues is the
continuing population growth, which is projected to lead to over three million new
residents within the next five years (SFWMD, 2019c). In addition, concomitant
freshwater demand is estimated to increase by 25% until 2030 compared to 2005
(Environmental Protection Agency & Program, 2013).
To tackle these challenges, the water management districts in Florida including
the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) follow the principles of
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) (Stoa, 2014). Already in 2000, the
effective water supply plan indicated that traditional sources would eventually not be
enough to satisfy the needs of South Florida’s growing population while at the same time
treating the natural system sustainably (FDEP, FDEM, FDACS, & SFWMD, 2007). For a
long time, the focus laid on supply-side management measures that included dams,
reservoirs and distribution systems, and planners modeled for expected future growth
with increased capacity (Gordon Foundation, 2004). Water resources were seen as
infinite and solely limited by our ability to access and store them, which led to focusing
on meeting future projected demands with big, centralized and expensive engineering
solutions (Gordon Foundation, 2004). In South Florida, several alternative, “drought
resistant” sources were identified and constructed, for instance reclaimed water and
brackish water demineralization (FDEP et al., 2007). However, after realizing that
supply-side management of water with a continued expansion of infrastructures and
development of new water sources have become more and more expensive and
unsustainable, both economically and environmentally, there has been a trend towards
demand-side management approaches (Karamouz, Moridi, & Nazif, 2010). These
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management approaches recognize that water is a limited resource that needs to be
conserved and used sustainably (Gordon Foundation, 2004). Urban water demand
management (UWDM) is focused on measures to increase the efficiency and/or timing
of water consumption to maximize the use of the existing capacity (Gordon Foundation,
2004). Despite its initial application as a short-term approach, it has potential to change
resource use fundamentally in the long term (Gordon Foundation, 2004).
A common demand-side management tool of UWDM to reduce water
consumption and regulate the allocation of water is outdoor water use restrictions
(OWRs) (Milman & Polsky, 2016). Even though the U.S. alone has almost 30 statemandated OWRs, varying by frequency, timing, or duration, previous research has
mainly focused on its effectiveness as a policy tool to change people’s behavior and
conserve water (Kenney, Klein, & Clark, 2004; Loë, Moraru, Kreutzwiser, Schaefer, &
Mills, 2001; Milman & Polsky, 2016; Survis & Root, 2012). It has been documented that
different OWR programs lead to a reduction of the aggregate water consumption by 1456%, depending on severity and frequency of the restriction (Grafton & Ward, 2008;
Kenney et al., 2004; Renwick & Green, 2000). However, several studies have revealed
consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid OWRs or supply disruptions (Gordon,
Chapman, & Blamey, 2001; Hensher, Shore, & Train, 2006; Koss & Sami Khawaja,
2001; Tapsuwan, Brennan, Ingram, & Burton, 2007), which illustrates the potential to
allocate water more efficiently than previous restriction programs. Using a variety of
models and methods, some studies indicate that OWR programs are economically
inefficient. For instance, the economic loss caused by water use restrictions in Sydney,
Australia, in 2004-05, aggregated to A$235 million, which equals A$150 per household
(Grafton & Ward, 2008). Concerning the welfare impact of OWRs, a direct comparison of
study results is limited because different methods have been applied. For example,
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Mansur & Olmstead (2012) examined daily household consumption data from 11 urban
areas in the U.S. and Canada. Using the estimated demand, they were able to
determine the shadow price (the estimated price of a good for which no market price
exists) for marginal units of restricted water, by implementing a two-day-per-week OWR
for households. The average household’s shadow price was about three times higher
than what they actually paid for their water (Mansur & Olmstead, 2012). Finally,
regarding the implications of the price elasticity of water, it was calculated that a droughtrelated need to decrease demand by 20% with focus on outdoor use would require an
increase in marginal water price of about 50% (elasticity of -0.4) (Olmstead & Stavins,
2009). These results show that there may exist substantial gains from adopting pricebased approaches to regulate water demand versus using OWRs (Brennan, Tapsuwan,
& Ingram, 2007; Buck, Auffhammer, Hamilton, & Sunding, 2016; Grafton & Ward, 2008).
Therefore, the extensive usage of OWRs as a water conservation policy tool in
South Florida requires a better understanding of the economic implications to reveal
potential costs and benefits for the society. The purpose of the current study is to assess
the districtwide OWRs both regarding their effectiveness and economic impacts in the
region.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Demand-side Management Policy Tools
Water is technically a renewable resource. However, in human time spans it can
be considered a finite or exhaustible resource. Many regions of the world rely on water
from aquifers that has accumulated over the course of thousands of years and is now
removed at a rate that is much higher than can be refilled by rain. Therefore, water
shortages have become increasingly common in many parts of the world, including
North America, Europe and Australia. The water utilities need to handle the issue of
water supply shortages to ensure a sustainable long-term water supply security.
Historically, the focus of water management was on the supply-side management to
increase the supply to meet projected water demand challenges (Halich & Stephenson,
2009). However, demographic trends and resource constraints increasingly limit the
scope of expanding water supply. Instead, urban water demand management (UWDM)
targets an increase of water use efficiency through the application of different measures,
such as water pricing and metering, OWRs that promote water conservation, operational
and maintenance measures to reduce loss and general consumption, and water saving
devices or public participation programs in water conservation (Loë et al., 2001). These
approaches can be subdivided into price and non-price measures with the latter
requiring a much more active participation from water users (Borisova, Rawls, & Adams,
2013). In general, non-price water demand management tools belong to one of the
following categories: public education, technological improvements and water use
restrictions (Kenney, Goemans, Klein, Lowrey, & Reidy, 2008). In most cases, water
utilities do not solely use price to steer their customers’ water consumption (Kenney et
al., 2008). Instead, as a result of political pushback, equity concerns, and legal
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limitations they combine price with non-price policies that aim at the short- or long-term
reduction of water consumption (Kenney et al., 2008).
2.1.1 Non-price Tool: Public Education
Public education as a water conservation measure is usually applied in
combination with additional measures. Therefore, the pure effect of awareness
campaigns is not clearly detectable, but generally expected to reduce water
consumption between 2-5% (Baumann, Boland, & Haneman, 1998). However, the
impact on water consumption varies widely depending on different education campaign
designs, for instance face-to-face campaigns at schools or town halls versus billing
inserts and pamphlets. Personal contact and repetitive messages, such as over the
radio, presumably have a stronger effect on water conservation than a onetime billing
insert. Nonetheless, results can vary significantly: while Renwick & Green (2000) found a
water use reduction of 8% caused by a public information campaign (no detail on the
nature of the campaign was available), a study from the UK that assessed the effect of
an information campaign among 8000 residential customers including direct mailing,
radio and newspaper advertisement, found no demand reduction and only 5% of the
surveyed population indicated that they had noticed the campaign at all (Howarth &
Butler, 2004). The presented findings indicate the existence of great variations among
the different designs of this type of approach.
2.1.2 Non-price Tool: Technological Changes
Concerning technological improvements, the National Energy Policy Act requires
all new constructions in the U.S., as of 1992, to install the most advanced low-flow
toilets, showerheads, faucets, clothes and dishwashers (United States Environmental
Protection Agency, 2008). Studies have demonstrated the effect of such regulations,
with differing results for retrofit and replacement programs. Both retrofit programs,
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considered as a temporary measure such as a faucet aerator or a low-flow shower head,
and complete replacements with more efficient appliances have shown to lead to water
use reductions. Renwick and Archibald (1998) performed an empirical study of
household water demand in two Californian cities, revealing that the installation of lowflow toilets reduced consumption by 10% per toilet, low-flow showerheads by 8% per
fixture and the adoption of water-efficient irrigation technologies by 11%. A study by
Kenney et al. (2008) found similar results with an average reduction of household water
consumption of 10% because of participation in an indoor rebate program. Complete
replacements with more efficient appliances seem to lead to greater water use
reductions than retrofits: Several studies by Mayer et al. (2000; 2003; 2004) analyzed
the effects of high-efficiency plumbing fixture retrofits in the U.S. in Seattle, Tampa and
the East Bay Municipal Utility District and found indoor savings varying between 37-50%
(Mayer, Deoreo, & Lewis, 2000; Mayer, Deoreo, Towler, & Lewis, 2003; Mayer, Deoreo,
Towler, Martin, & Lewis, 2004). However, it should be noted that the authors found
leakages to account for part of the water conserved, which points to the potential of
leakage detection programs to reduce wasting significant amounts of water. Despite the
pure conservation success, the cost of the appliance replacement must not be too high
compared to the water rates. Otherwise it takes too long to recover the money spent for
new appliances through reduced water bills caused by decreased water usage (Barrett,
2004), which removes the incentive to replace the appliance in the first place.
Another study analyzed a program by the Miami-Dade Water and Sewer
Department in South Florida which included full retrofit for senior and low-income
households, exchange of high-efficiency showerheads and rebates for high-efficiency
toilets and clothes washers between 2005 and 2007 (Lee, Tansel, & Balbin, 2011).
Overall, within the first and second year of the retrofit water consumption dropped by 6-
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14% with toilets and clothes washers leading to higher reductions (Lee et al., 2011).
Furthermore, participants who had more than one appliance with higher efficiency
reached a greater water use reduction (Lee et al., 2011). Immediately after the retrofit or
exchange, participants first increased their water consumption (Lee et al., 2011). This
offsetting behavior dissipated after one to two years (Lee et al., 2011).
For outdoor water consumption, technological improvements include smart
irrigation devices such as rain sensors or soil moisture sensors. The 2000 Florida
Statutes already require every resident “[…] who purchases and installs an automatic
lawn sprinkler system after May 1, 1991, shall install a rain sensor device or switch
which will override the irrigation cycle of the sprinkler system when adequate rainfall has
occurred” (The 2000 Florida Statutes, 2000). However, how closely this regulation is
being followed is questionable since enforcement is relatively difficult.
2.1.3 Non-price Tool: Outdoor Water Use Restrictions (OWRs)
Outdoor water use restrictions (OWRs) are among the most popular measures,
while they are relatively under-studied (Survis & Root, 2012). Outdoor water use
restrictions can either be voluntary or mandatory and most of them do not restrict a
certain amount of water per residential customer or household but instead specific times
(e.g., not between 10am to 4pm) or uses (e.g., no car washing, no sprinkler using). In
other words, certain behaviors are restricted. Since outdoor water use is climatesensitive and connected to behavioral and cultural factors, it is generally more flexible
than indoor water use (Milman & Polsky, 2016). Therefore, OWRs were originally
thought to be implemented as a stopgap measure to decrease an immediate or
temporary discrepancy between supply and demand, for instance during a drought
(Milman & Polsky, 2016). However, OWRs have been implemented as long-term
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measures in many parts of the world (Milman & Polsky, 2016), aiming to increase the
efficiency of irrigation practices. As a consequence of their large abundance, criticism
has risen against OWRs, arguing that a scarce resource such as water should be
allocated through prices that reveal information about its relative scarcity and value in
use to avoid negative economic impacts (Olmstead, 2010). Therefore, the following shall
give an overview of the studied impacts of OWRs, summarizing research findings on
pure conservation effectiveness, as well as the more recent emphasis on welfare loss
and residents’ WTP to avoid such restrictions. The combination of these issues will
explain the diverging opinions on water restrictions, mainly between politicians and
economists.
2.1.3.1 Effectiveness
In general, studies have shown that OWRs can reduce the aggregate water
consumption by 4-56%, depending on severity and frequency of the restriction (Loë et
al., 2001; Brennan, Tapsuwan, & Ingram, 2007; Grafton & Ward, 2007; Kenney, Klein, &
Clark, 2004). A study by Kenney et al. (2004) revealed the significant difference between
voluntary and mandatory (one- to three-days-per-week irrigation permitted) restrictions
at eight utilities in Colorado in 2002, showing that voluntary restrictions led to water use
reductions of 4-12% while the reduction effect of mandatory restrictions varied between
18-56%, depending on strictness. An analysis of the water use from Southwest Florida
residents between 1998 and 2010 revealed that tightened OWRs from two- to one-dayper-week watering resulted in a reduction of water consumption of 13% (Boyer, Dukes,
Duerr, & Bliznyuk, 2018).
However, there are some limitations that require attention: the design impacts the
overall effectiveness in a way that restrictions during certain days or times may not lead
to an aggregate water use reduction but only a shift of the consumption (Survis & Root,
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2012; Hensher, Shore & Train, 2006), which highlights that compliance does not equal
effectiveness (Survis & Root, 2012). Furthermore, OWRs incur additional costs to water
supply utilities that, in theory at least, need to monitor and enforce them (Loë et al.,
2001).
Examples of non-compliance are delivered by one case study from Southeast
Florida that found over-watering during wet periods, caused by neglected temporal
changes in weather and lawn water demand (Survis & Root, 2012). Furthermore, a study
conducted with household water consumption data in Tampa, Florida assessed the
effectiveness of OWRs and found non-compliance having a strong effect, preventing the
OWRs from being a successful conservation tool (Ozan & Alsharif, 2013). It was
revealed that customers used over 7% more water when the implemented OWR became
stricter, from two- to one-day-per-week watering(Ozan & Alsharif, 2013). The study’s
authors assumed that households were in a dilemma, torn between complying with local
conservation regulations and rules imposed by homeowners associations(Ozan &
Alsharif, 2013). Potential additional reasons listed included that enforcement was not
strict enough and fines not high enough and possibly cultural reasons that put a high
importance on the perfection of the lawn (Ozan & Alsharif, 2013). Finally, a remarkable
finding of a study from Northern Nevada in 2008 and 2010 was that an official watering
schedule with designated days for each household caused wasteful behavior
(Castledine, Moeltner, Price, & Stoddard, 2011). Weekly water use was 30-40% higher
when customers followed the scheduled days for weekly usage and 50-60% higher for
weekly peak consumption compared to periods when customers were allowed to
distribute the number of days independently (Castledine et al., 2011). To the author’s
knowledge, this is the only study assessing this characteristic of OWRs.
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The review illustrates that the majority of studies on the effectiveness of OWRs
provides evidence of their overall conservation success, with some results highlighting the
importance of an appropriate design and potential factors for non-compliance.
2.1.3.2 Willingness to Pay (WTP)
Several studies have surveyed consumers’ WTP to avoid different kinds of
OWRs or supply disruptions, with diverse results. Many of these studies focus on
consumers in Australia who have to deal with the most extensive OWRs: more than 75%
of all households are affected by water restrictions (Brennan et al., 2007). A study
among residents of Western Australia showed them to have a WTP of additional 22% of
the annual water bill to move from one-day to three-day-per-week sprinkler use
(Tapsuwan et al., 2007). Compared to that, residents in California were found to be
willing to pay up to US$16.92 per month (in 1993 dollars) to avoid a 50% water shortage
every 20 years (Koss & Sami Khawaja, 2001). These studies are rather difficult to
compare because of the different scenarios assessed, but most results show customers’
(in general willing to pay) general WTP to avoid restrictions or shortages. In contrast,
one other study conducted in Canberra, Australia, revealed that residents were unwilling
to pay to avoid the majority of drought-induced restrictions (Hensher et al., 2006).
Interestingly enough, the residents were willing to pay an additional $239 (31.26% of
their annual bill) on top of the average water bill to remove the most severe regulation, a
daily, year-round restriction (Hensher et al., 2006). However, there were two notable
limitations: the study included only three different levels of restriction to choose from and
having a defined ending date is both uncommon and unrealistic (Hensher et al., 2006).
Since citizens require a clearly defined scenario in order to make informed decisions,
these limitations are relevant in most studies. Nevertheless, the majority of studies
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reveal that people are willing to pay to avoid OWRs which illustrates the potential to
allocate water more efficiently.
2.1.3.3 Welfare Impact
Concerning the welfare impacts of OWRs, again direct comparison is limited
because different methods have been applied. The welfare costs of OWRs can result
from direct implementation costs, their time requirements, the significant investment in
public education campaigns and the water utilities’ foregone revenues. One production
model approach has shown that the net welfare loss for Australian consumers caused by
a sprinkler ban amounted to A$347 per household (Brennan et al., 2007). The number
was calculated by averaging the time needed for manual watering at 33% of the mean
wage rate, and it can climb to as high as A$871 when calculated at 100% wage rate
(Brennan et al., 2007). Another study calculated the loss in Marshallian surplus, which is
the total welfare consisting of consumer surplus (the difference between what the
consumer pays and what he would have been willing to pay) (Murphy, 2019) and
producer surplus (the difference between the actual price and the price the producer
would be willing to sell it for) (Chappelow, 2019), with the result that raising the
volumetric price of water charged to households to achieve the same level of
consumption would generate a much bigger Marshallian surplus than the use of
mandatory OWRs (Grafton & Ward, 2008). First, the difference between the welfare loss
from removing OWRs and implementing a market-clearing price was calculated; next,
the benefit from reallocating water from indoor to outdoor was estimated to find a
positive Marshallian surplus of A$238 million, which equals A$55 per person (Grafton &
Ward, 2008). A study conducted by Mansur & Olmstead (2012) among households in
the U.S. and Canada used estimates of marginal prices to reveal price elasticities that
strongly varied between customers. Effects of moving to a market-based approach
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compared to a two-day-per-week OWR was simulated with resulting welfare gains of
US$96 per household during the lawn-watering season which was about 29% of the
average annual household’s expenditures on water (Mansur & Olmstead, 2012).
Especially when the heterogeneity of the customers and different values for water uses
are considered, estimates of welfare losses increase.
All these case studies are focused on the economic explanation that OWRs
cause greater welfare loss compared to increased volumetric prices (Sibly, 2006). These
costs arise from the inability of households to equate the marginal cost of water to its
marginal benefit in use, which results in households that are willing to pay for their water
to satisfy their particular (outdoor) uses but are unable to do so (Sibly, 2006). These
findings of significant welfare losses illustrate why economists demand action from
politicians who fear the negative outcry that might come with an increase of water prices.
2.1.4 Price tool: Water Rates
Generally, the discussion between price and non-price advocates circles around
two main opposing assumptions: price proponents argue that current prices do not
reflect the water supply’s real economic costs, such as treatment, distribution or costs of
current reservoirs (Olmstead & Stavins, 2009). Therefore, if prices were generally higher
and increased during droughts, people would react, determined by their preferences,
and decrease their water use (Olmstead & Stavins, 2009). In contrast, non-price
proponents debate that residential water demand is comparatively price inelastic,
meaning that an increase in price would not effectively lead to a water use reduction,
and that price cannot be used as a tool to steer a good necessary to satisfy basic human
needs (Renwick & Green, 2000).
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Following microeconomic theory and empirical research, customers will reduce
their consumption when prices increase (Marshall, 1920). The magnitude of the
decrease depends on the product’s price elasticity, which is the responsiveness of the
quantity demanded to a change in price (Marshall, 1920). However, the law of demand
assumes consumers to be knowledgeable about prices, which is often violated (Gaudin,
2006). The non-transparency of prices can lead to price elasticities below their actual
potential (Gaudin, 2006). Despite that, Olmstead and Stavins (2009) found that water
demand is not generally “unresponsive to price”.
For instance, a study by Renwick & Green (2000) compared the effectiveness of
different demand-side management (DSM) policies, including OWRs and prices, with the
help of an econometric model. Over an eight year period in the 1990s (drought 1985-92)
residential water demand in California was evaluated to identify how the aggregate
quantity demanded was reduced (Renwick & Green, 2000). While water rationing and
use restrictions were found to reduce the average household water consumption by 19%
and 29%, respectively, a 10% increase in price led to a reduction of 1.6% (Renwick &
Green, 2000), which is comparatively low.
Performing a comprehensive meta-analysis, Dalhuisen et al. (2003) assessed 64
regions in the U.S. and Europe concerning their price elasticity and found great
variations. While price elasticities in the Eastern U.S. averaged only -0.005, in the
Western U.S. they averaged -0.17 (Dalhuisen, Florax, de Groot, & Nijkamp, 2003). The
authors link the differences in estimated elasticities to spatial and temporal variations
and different research designs, but also to household characteristics (Dalhuisen et al.,
2003). An example for the influence of household characteristics on price elasticity could
be that low-income households might have the tendency to use only that amount of
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water which is necessary for their basic needs, while high-income households have
more disposable income to spent on recreational water-use activities and price
increases do not appear to be significant enough to require a behavioral change.
Therefore, mainly middle-income households would reduce their affluent water
consumption if prices rise. Compared to the results of Dalhuisen et al., a comprehensive
literature survey by Worthington & Hoffman (2008), which includes results from 1980 to
2005 from different regions of the world, found higher price elasticities than Dalhuisen et
al. (2003), ranging between -0.25 and -0.75 (Worthington & Hoffman, 2008). To translate
these elasticities into understandable values for water conservation targets, using an
elasticity of -0.4 as an example, a drought related demand reduction of 20% would
require a price increase of about 50% (Reynaud, 2013).
Floridians are supposedly a little more responsive to water rate increases than
the average US citizen: a 10% increase in water rate would be expected to lead to a 4 to
8% decrease of water consumption (Whitcomb, 2005). Another influential factor found by
an analysis derived from household-level panel data for two California communities
showed that outdoor water use appears to be more price elastic than indoor use
(Renwick & Archibald, 1998). The finding from Renwick & Archibald’s study seems
reasonable since outdoor usage is usually recreational use and does not satisfy basic
needs. A study by Kenney et al. (2008) looked at the interaction between OWRs and
price and revealed that the implementation of restrictions is associated with a 31%
decrease of water use, absent of any price for water (Kenney et al., 2008). Naturally, the
absence of a price is an unrealistic scenario, but it helps to theorize that with an
increasing price, the effect of restrictions decreases due to the price becoming a more
significant decision factor (Kenney et al., 2008). Furthermore, the type of price rate
structure has an impact on price elasticity, as revealed by Olmstead, Hanemann, &
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Stavins (2003). They found a price elasticity of about -0.6 for households facing an
increasing block rate structure and -0.19 for those facing uniform marginal prices
(Olmstead et al., 2003). Additionally, the amount of information provided on the bill was
found to have an impact on price elasticity. A study by Gaudin (2006) focusing on billing
information of almost 500 utilities across the US revealed that price-related information
increased price elasticity by at least 30%. As a general conclusion it can be noted that
water demand is said to be rather “inelastic” at current prices (Olmstead & Stavins,
2009), however, changes in water rates and rate structures, customers’ income and
more factors have a crucial influence on this finding. Therefore, to use price as an
effective management tool, certain rate structures and overall higher rates could be
beneficial.
There are a few supposed advantages to market-based approaches. One is the
household’s ability to decide which uses to decrease depending on their individual
preferences. Another advantage would be that market-based approaches enable
households to respond heterogeneously. Some households would decrease their
demand for water-based activities that they do not value enough to justify the price
increase, while others would be able to continue participating in those activities if they
felt the activity was worth the cost (Olmstead & Stavins, 2009). As previously mentioned,
current water prices do not reflect the true price of water, because they are mostly set by
the government and have the tendency to not entirely reflect the actual cost of water
production and external costs to extract the water and return it as waste (Barrett, 2004).
Water metering is a prerequisite to enable water pricing, since it allows charging on a
per unit basis, transferring a price-signal to the individual customer and thereby
increasing economic efficiency and promoting conservation (Baumann, 1998). Even the
sole introduction of metering has shown to lead to a reduction of water consumption,
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ignoring the effects of different water rate structures (Dalhuisen, de Groot, & Nijkamp,
2001; Dalhuisen & Nijkamp, 2001). A comprehensive survey of more than 10,000 multifamily residences in the U.S. revealed that submetering and a price increase led to a
15.6% reduction in per capita demand, equaling almost 22 gallons per person per day
(Mayer et al., 2004). The previous example by Mayer et al. (2004) shows that metering
and pricing has an undeniable impact on residential water consumption. In that context,
different price rate structures have a steering effect on residential water use. One can
differentiate between a flat fee, a uniform rate, a decreasing or increasing block rate
structure or a seasonal rate. While a flat fee charges every customer the same fixed
price, ignoring the actual individual consumption, a uniform rate means that every 1,000
gallons cost the same. On the contrary, under a decreasing block rate the price of every
additional 1,000 gallons of water decreases the more the customer consumes. The
exact opposite is the case under an increasing block rate structure, leading to every
additional 1,000 gallons used by the customer to cost more than the previous one. All
these rate structures refer to the respective billing cycle, which is usually monthly or
quarterly. Under a seasonal rate, water prices increase during months of high
consumption. For instance, Miami-Dade County Water and Sewer implemented
seasonal rates between 1998 and 2004 (Whitcomb, 2005). For six month at a time it was
alternated between two different five-block structures (Whitcomb, 2005). The last two
price structures mentioned, increasing block rate and seasonal rate, send a price signal
to the customers to decrease consumption, which is why they are also called
conservation pricing (Inman & Jeffrey, 2006).
In general, to avoid inequity issues between income groups and ensure enough
revenue for the utility with simultaneously reduced water consumption, permanent
surveys and observations seem to be unavoidable to control the effect a price approach
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has on water users, resources and utilities. Furthermore, a certain amount which is
necessary to cover basic needs should be affordable at a low price (rate structure) while
everything that goes beyond this base amount can be charged with a much higher perunit fee. Alternatively, equity issues could be prevented by a fixed charge that is
calculated using property values (as a proxy for a customer’s ability to be able to pay for
water) or discounted for residents eligible for welfare (Sibly, 2006). Finally, a price
increase or conservation pricing can serve as an incentive for the implementation of new
water conservation technologies because of a possibility to save money in the long run
(Olmstead & Stavins, 2009).
In conclusion, according to Sibly (2006), the pure implementation of OWRs
compared to pricing is not an efficient way of water allocation but rather it provides
evidence that the charge is inefficient. Only in emergencies OWRs would be the fastest
and most effective way to conserve water but not as a long-term measure (Sibly, 2006).
Instead, OWRs cause not only utilities but also consumers to experience an economic
loss resulting from the foregone economic value/benefits that would be gained from
satisfying the water demand through increased water deliveries (Jenkins, Lund, &
Howitt, 2003). Therefore, this study performs an economic assessment of the impacts of
the OWRs in South Florida.
2.1.5 Additional Considerations
There are a variety of factors influencing not only the effectiveness of DSM tools
but also residential water consumption in general that are beyond the control of water
utilities. These include for instance local weather, which impacts short-term water usage,
especially for outdoor irrigation, and yearly consumption patterns. Therefore, it is not
uncommon that weather-related variables are controlled for in regression-based studies
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evaluating price and nonprice management tools (e.g. Gutzler & Nims, 2005). For
instance, the model designed by Kenney et al. (2008) predicted that water consumption
would increase by about 2% for every additional 1°Fahrenheit in average daily maximum
temperature, while consumption would decrease by about 4% per inch of precipitation.
However, beyond that additional uncertainties are prevalent. The exact kind of such
weather variables (frequency, total amount, variation) might have an effect and
oftentimes researchers have to handle the constraint that water usage data exists only
on a monthly level while weather happens daily (Kenney et al., 2008).
Besides weather factors, demographic variables have a significant effect on
residential water consumption. Ongoing research revealed that household income,
family size, occupants’ age and individual preferences concerning water conservation
have an impact (Jones & Morris, 1984; Renwick & Green, 2000; (Sheila, Michael, &
Robert, 2002). Finally, housing characteristics can have an effect, for instance owning
versus renting, the age of the house (and of its appliances), the size of the house and
the lot (Renwick & Green, 2000). Unfortunately, limitations of available data impact the
ability of researchers to analyze all of these impacts sufficiently.
2.2 Difference-in-Differences Approach
The Difference-in-Differences (DID) approach is a quasi-experimental research
design to estimate causal effects and is widely used in empirical economics and policy
evaluation (Lechner, 2010). It is used in the current study to estimate the effect of OWRs
on residential water use. The DID approach is said to be transparent and suitable to
estimate the effects of governmental policy interventions (Angrist & Krueger, 1998).
Difference-in-Differences has a long history in economics with early uses dating back to
the 1940s (Angrist & Krueger, 1998). Two studies, one by Card & Krueger (1994)
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assessing the effects of state minimum wage law on employment, and one by Meyer
(1990) assessing worker’s compensation benefit increases on the length of claims,
triggered its wider application.
In most cases, it can be distinguished between four groups which are the
treatment group before and after the introduction of the treatment and the control group,
likewise before and after the introduction of the treatment (Lechner, 2010). The idea is to
compare the difference in outcomes of the affected and unaffected groups, before and
after the policy intervention (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2002) to clearly distinguish
the effect attributable to the policy change.
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3. METHODOLOGY
The current study seeks to perform an economic assessment of the impacts of
OWRs implemented in the SFWMD, where outdoor water use for irrigation and other
purposes can account for up to 50% of total residential water use (SFWMD, 2019). After
years of drought-related limited periods of OWRs primarily in the 2000s, the SFWMD
finally implemented year-round OWRs in 2010. To analyze the effectiveness and
economic impacts of OWRs, an integrated framework is developed whose main
components are a Difference-in-Differences (DID) approach, a value function model and
the application of a discrete choice model. The current study has three primary
objectives:
1. To reveal the effectiveness of OWRs in South Florida in terms of reduced water
consumption by using the DID approach.
2. To estimate the relationship between the implementation of OWRs and divisions
of the hydrological system in South Florida.
3. To compute the revealed preference values for avoiding OWRs, and compare
the same with the stated preference values (WTP) estimated in a previous study
by Seeteram, Engel, & Mozumder (2018).
The current work is unique because we analyzed residential water use data at
different times and at different levels of OWRs as a natural experiment to assess
variations in people’s actual behavior. The analysis of actual water use behavior should
deliver stronger evidence for WTP values than stated preference analysis. Furthermore,
the DID approach does not only show a correlation but goes a step further to establish
causality by utilizing the interaction term and estimating the treatment effect. The DID
approach allows one to estimate the amount of water that residents consumed as a
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consequence of different OWRs and therefore provides a more precise estimated impact
of water use restrictions as a water management policy tool. Finally, the integration of
the DID analysis with the physical water management system allows us to connect the
human and the natural system, which enables us to estimate a value function of the
value addition for the society from OWRs.
3.1 Study Area
The study analyzes the water use data of residents in Southern Florida, United
States, ranging from Orlando to the Florida Keys. The region’s climate is subtropical to
tropical with a pronounced rainy season from May to October (Weather Atlas, 2020).
Florida’s average daily temperature is 70.7°F, with highest temperatures of 95°F in July
and 2,800 hours of sunshine over the course of the year (Weather Atlas, 2020). In
January, average lowest temperatures range between 40°F in the northern part (e.g.,
Pensacola, Tallahassee) and 60°F in the southern part of the state (e.g., West Palm
Beach, Miami) (Weather Atlas, 2020). The majority of the annual 55 inches of
precipitation occurs in the rainy season, causing an uneven distribution over the course
of the year (Weather Atlas, 2020).
Concerning outdoor water use, a few additional aspects are worth mentioning. In
Florida, the amount of precipitation usually decreases between March and June,
resulting in higher water consumption for outdoor water use (Marella, 1992).
Furthermore, because of increasing temperatures from March to May potential
evapotranspiration increases, leading to high water demand for grass and outdoor plants
which is one reason for increased water consumption from public-supply in these
months compared to the rest of the year (Marella, 1992). Finally, irrigation can be
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required year-round in South Florida because of overall warmer temperatures (Marella,
1992).
The combination of certain climate patterns, which are becoming more unreliable
as a result of climate change, with the water use of a continuously growing population
(see Table 3.1) are major factors leading to the occurrence of water shortages (FDEP et
al., 2007). That is why an efficient and sustainable management of water resources is
critical in South Florida.
Table 3.1: Population of 13 Analyzed Counties in South Florida
County

1995

2005

2015

2025

Broward

1,428,708

1,742,157

1,827,367

2,045,772

197,055

303,893

343,802

413,739

Glades

8,644

12,168

12,853

13,895

Hendry

31,280

37,861

38,096

41,337

Lee

382,830

545,931

665,845

826,909

Martin

113,550

140,647

150,062

165,756

2,076,171

2,395,071

2,653,934

3,062,631

Monroe

79,824

77,608

74,206

75,855

Okeechobee

32,059

38,627

40,052

43,146

Orange

765,731

1,050,333

1,252,396

1,576,726

Osceola

140,490

227,055

308,327

452,354

Palm Beach

988,743

1,273,752

1,378,417

1,559,585

St. Lucie

172,212

238,361

287,749

342,548

6,417,297

8,083,464

9,033,106

10,620,253

Collier

Miami-Dade

Total

Source: Office of Economic & Demographic Research (2017)

The state of Florida is divided into five Water Resources Management Districts on the
basis of the natural hydrological system. The studied counties are all encompassed,
either entirely or partly, in the SFWMD, the agency that manages the regional water
resources from Orlando in Central Florida to the Florida Keys in the very South (see
Figure 3.1) (Abtew & Huebner, 2002). From the Kissimmee Chain of Lakes and the
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Kissimmee River in the North, the water flows South through Lake Okeechobee, the
Water Conservation Areas (WCAs) and the Everglades (FDEP et al., 2007). Lake
Okeechobee is the main actor in the hydrologic system because its water is essential for
the surrounding communities, and for the Everglades Agricultural Area (EAA), the St.
Lucie and Caloosahatchee basins (Abtew & Huebner, 2002) and the WCAs. With an
area of 1,763 km2 and an average depth of 2.7 m, it is an important source of water for
the canals in Palm Beach, Broward and Miami-Dade and it recharges surface and
groundwater supplies (Abtew & Huebner, 2002). Historically, the main objectives of the
regulation schedule for Lake Okeechobee have included water supply and flood control,
which is why the lake’s water levels are a suitable indicator of wet and drought
conditions (Abtew & Huebner, 2002). The Upper Kissimmee Chain of Lakes, which
includes Lakes Myrtle, Alligator, Mary Jane, Gentry, East Tohopekaliga, Tohopekaliga
and Lake Kissimmee, is in turn an essential water source for Lake Okeechobee (Abtew
& Huebner, 2002). In the South, the three WCAs follow specific regulation schedules as
“part of the water storage and distribution system” (Abtew & Huebner, 2002).
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Figure 3.1: Hydrological Divisions of the South Florida Water Management District

Source: (SFWMD, 2019b)

3.2 Data Description
A group of 16 counties belongs to the SFWMD. Ten of these counties are located
entirely within the SFWMD, which are Broward, Collier, Glades, Hendry, Lee, Martin,
Miami-Dade, Monroe, Palm Beach and St. Lucie. The other six counties are split
between the SFWMD and one of the neighboring water management districts which are
St. John’s River Water Management District in the Northeast and Southwest Florida
Water Management District in the Northwest. For the purpose of the current study, data
from 13 counties could be analyzed concerning the OWRs’ effect on the residential
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water use. We could include water use data of the ten counties that are entirely within
the SFWMD as well as the parts of Okeechobee, Orange and Osceola that also fall
within the borders of the SFWMD. As a result of incomplete water use data of the three
remaining counties, Charlotte, Highlands and Polk, they were excluded from the DID
analysis. However, they could be included in the value function approach.
Figure 3.2: Florida's Five Water Management Districts

Adapted from SFWMD (2018)

The type of water use data we used falls under the category of public supply,
which is defined as “Water withdrawn by public and private water suppliers and delivered
to groups of users […] such as domestic, commercial, industrial, thermoelectric power,
public water use, and other water use.” (Marella, 1992). A clear separation of the portion
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served to residential users was not possible because of the type of the data. Therefore,
a few factors need to be considered for the interpretation of results: the exact number of
people served was provided, of which residential users account for the largest portion
(Marella, 1992); the number of non-permanent residents (tourists) using water is not
documented; all customers in the SFWMD have to follow OWRs but exact outdoor
consumption is not measured.
Figure 3.3: Overview of the Outdoor Water Use Restrictions in the South Florida Water
Management District

Source: SFWMD (2019)

The areas of the 16 counties that are located within the SFWMD’s boundaries
follow one of two irrigation restrictions today (see Figure 3.3): one of the two OWRs
allows two-days-per-week of outdoor water use (yellow) while the other OWR allows
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three-days-per-week outdoor water use (green). The fragmentation of the SFWMD is the
result of a compromise between politicians, water managers, utilities and the
landscaping industry (Reid, 2012). Unlike the rest of Florida, the SFWMD targeted a
districtwide three-days-per-week OWR taking into consideration arguments from the
landscaping industry and water utilities (Reid, 2012). However, local governments were
given the freedom to choose a stricter two-days-per-week OWR (Reid, 2012), for
instance to decrease confusion in those split counties in the North of the district.
Furthermore, some bigger cities have a different rule than their surrounding
counties, which could not be considered in the present analysis. Because of the spatial
level of the analysis, which is the county level, only the overall county’s OWRs could be
considered. The districtwide, year-round landscape irrigation rule has been in effect
since 2010. Before 2010, counties or parts of counties would follow varying types of
OWRs predominantly in times of dry periods or drought events (see Figure 3.4). The
different types of OWRs can be categorized into three groups that will be referred to
from now on as OWRP_1, OWRP_2 and OWRP_3 (for Outdoor Water use Restriction
Phase 1, 2 or 3). Outdoor Water use Restriction Phase 1 (OWRP_1) is the least strict
with three-days-per-week outdoor water use permitted and officially referred to as Phase
1 restriction (FDEP et al., 2007). This restriction is followed by Outdoor Water use
Restriction Phase 2 (OWRP_2) which allows two-days-per-week outdoor watering and is
called Phase 2 restriction (FDEP et al., 2007). The strictest restriction is called Outdoor
Water use Restriction Phase 3 (OWRP_3) which restricts outdoor water use to only oneday-per-week and is referred to as Phase 3 restriction (FDEP et al., 2007). In times of
drought, OWRP_1 (Phase 1) aimed for a 15% overall water use reduction, OWRP_2
(Phase 2) targeted a 30% water use reduction and OWRP_3 (Phase 3) was set to
reduce overall consumption by 45% (FDEP et al., 2007).
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Within our period of analysis, starting in 1985, the first time that OWRs were
implemented was caused by a districtwide drought that lasted from June 1989 to May
1990 (Trimble, Marban, Sculley, & Beach, 1990). As a consequence, the OWRs started
as a demand-side water management tool in November 1989 and were in effect until
May of the following year (Trimble et al., 1990). Exact information on the strictness of the
OWRs was inaccessible which is why the intermediate, most commonly implemented
OWRP_2 was assumed for the analysis (see Figure 3.4). To the author’s knowledge,
after the drought ended in 1990 there were no restrictions in effect for almost ten years.
The only regulation that residents have been following continuously up until now, is that
no outdoor watering is allowed between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. caused by peak
evapotranspiration during these hours (Bates, 2009). The next dry period occurred
around the year 2000, which was the driest year on record up to that time with
November 1999 to May 2001 as the driest dry-wet-dry season (FDEP et al., 2007). As a
consequence, Lake Okeechobee’s water level dropped to the lowest stages ever
recorded until then (FDEP et al., 2007), which was the reason why the SFWMD
implemented OWRP_2 and OWRP_3 with the latter applying to surface water use in
certain areas only (SFWMD, 2002). As mentioned before, due to the spatial level of
analysis, only the general OWRP_2 implemented at the county level that lasted from
December 2000/January 2001 to September 2001 was considered (SFWMD, 2002).
When it was detectable and implemented at the county level, OWRP_1 was also
considered (SFWMD, 2002).
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Figure 3.4: Overview of Different Phases and Timing of the Outdoor Water Use Restrictions in 13 South Florida Counties
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Concerning the exact order of counties implementing different phases of OWRs
from 2003 onwards, the available information is difficult to access which is why we have
made several careful assumptions to address these challenges. Starting in 2003, Lee
and Collier counties were the only regions that implemented OWRP_1 for a prolonged
period of time independently of a drought (Bates, 2009). The next drought event took
place in 2006-07 when South Florida broke a new drought record and experienced one
of the driest periods in recorded climate history (SFWMD, 2009). From here on it starts
to become a little bit challenging to keep track of which county had what kind of
restriction in place when. The majority of counties in the SFWMD implemented OWRP_2
as a response to the dry conditions (Bates, 2009). Exceptions were Glades and Hendry
that followed OWRP_3, while Monroe and Okeechobee did not have any restrictions yet
(FDEP et al., 2007). Orange and Osceola, partly located in St. John’s Water
Management District, presumably followed OWRP_2 already a little before the other
counties due to the endeavor to decrease the confusion among those counties’ residents
(Bates, 2009). Another reason for the seemingly random variations between counties is
their allocation into different regional groups that serve the purpose of water supply
planning (see Figure 3.5). Therefore, implementing drought restrictions within the
boundaries of these regions resulted in OWRs that were not applicable to the entire
county, which is why the exact division and implementation of OWRs could not always
be considered in the analysis.
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Figure 3.5: The Water Supply Planning Regions of the South Florida Water Management
District

Source: SFWMD (2018)

At least from July to December 2007, all 13 counties had OWRP_2 in place,
turning into OWRP_3 from January to April 2008 for all counties except Orange and
Osceola that continued following St. John’s OWRP_2 (SFWMD, 2009). Subsequently,
the restrictions were not entirely removed. Instead, OWRP_2 remained implemented
throughout the entire decision-making process about districtwide OWRs from June 2008
to December 2009 (Bates, 2009). In 2010, the year-round landscape irrigation rule came
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into effect, requiring a minimum of OWRP_1 in all counties, with some counties
voluntarily implementing the stricter version, OWRP_2.
3.2.1 Variable Description and Preparation
For the DID approach we could analyze almost 4,000 observations. Water use
data were taken from the Scientific Investigation Report, 2015 from Marella (2019). The
Per capita water use was used as the dependent variable, ranging between 1,234.5 and
11,700.7 gallons (see Table 3.2) with a mean value of 5395.99 gallons. The wide range
of the values could not be verified by us, but it might be explicable with unobservable
factors that can lead to high or low outliers. High outliers could result from uncounted
tourists using water that falls under the category of public water use. Higher observed
uses per resident are possible when these guests, as additional temporary water users,
are not counted. A similar situation applies to other increased uses resulting from nonresidential customers such as commercial or industrial consumers, who use greater
volumes of water and their proportion can vary between counties. Low outliers (less
water consumption per resident) on the other hand could result from residents using
private wells for outdoor use and thereby reducing their overall water use.
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Table 3.2: Overview of the Continuous Variables
Variable
Per capita
water use
(dependent
variable in
DID)
Bachelor’s
degree or
higher
Median
household
income
Lake
Okeechobee
water level
(in feet)
Lake
Kissimmee
water level
(in feet)
WCA water
level (in
feet)
Precipitation
(in inch)
Evaporation
(in inch)

Observations
4,000

Mean
5,400

St. Deviation
1,590

Min
1,240

Max
11,700

4,000

19.2

7.4

6.2
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4,000

36,700

8,940

16,400

61,200

4,870

14.1

1.98

8.94

18.3

4,870

50.5

1.1

48

53

4,870

13

0.64

11.2

15.5

4,870

4.5

3.8

0

29.4

4,870

0.25

0.07

0.1

0.49

Table 3.3: Description of the Dummy and Categorial Variables
Dummy and categorial variables
OWRP_1
OWRP_2
OWRP_3
Treatment2007
Interaction1
Interaction2
Interaction3
Number of restricted days
(dependent variable in value
function)

Variable description
Phase 1 restriction with three-days-per-week outdoor
watering allowed; 0=inactive, 1=active
Phase 2 restriction with two-days-per-week outdoor
watering allowed; 0=inactive, 1=active
Phase 3 restriction with one-day-per-week outdoor
watering allowed; 0=inactive, 1=active
0=before 2007, 1=including and after 2007
Interaction: OWRP_1 x Treatment2007; 0=inactive,
1=active
Interaction: OWRP_2 x Treatment2007; 0=inactive,
1=active
Interaction: OWRP_3 x Treatment2007; 0=inactive,
1=active
0=no OWR, 4=OWRP_1, 5=OWRP_2, 6=OWRP_3
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For some counties, data on population served were incomplete, which is why in
some cases the county’s actual population was used (Broward 2011, all of Monroe),
provided by the Office of Economic & Demographic Research (2017). If the actual
population appeared to be too high compared to existing values, the gaps were filled
using linear interpolation. The respective years’ Per capita water use was calculated,
using this value. This method was applied to Collier (2011) and Orange (1998).
The water use data for Monroe county were included in the Miami-Dade usage
because the water is provided by Miami-Dade Water and Sewer. The exported amount
of water is documented clearly and used for this study. However, the actual number of
residents served was not provided and so the county’s total population had to be used
as a proxy.
Regarding the weather data, which originally included the total monthly
Precipitation in inches and the average monthly Temperature in degree Fahrenheit, data
from one weather station in each county were used. The data were provided by the
Florida Climate Center (2019) and by NOAA (2019). Predominantly in the earlier years,
only daily data were available from which the monthly average for Temperature or sum
for Precipitation was calculated. Where data on entire months were missing, values were
calculated based on averages from existing months. For incomplete Temperature data,
the average of the existing data was taken and for incomplete Precipitation data the sum
of the existing days was extrapolated.
The variable for educational attainment is called Bachelor’s degree or higher and
the data were provided by the Unites States Census Bureau (2019). Finally, the data on
Median household income were downloaded from the online platform “American Fact
Finder” provided by the United States Census Bureau (2019). In both cases, there were
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no exact data available for every individual month and year for each county, so the
missing values were calculated with linear interpolation.
For the value function approach, we could analyze 4,900 observations because
of the inclusion of some additional years of data from Charlotte, Highlands and Polk
counties. The independent variable was called Number of restricted days per week and
varied between 0 and 6, which implies that there were periods without restrictions (0
days restricted equals 7 days outdoor watering allowed in a week) and periods with the
strictest OWRP_3 with 6 days restricted (1 day per week watering allowed). Lake
Okeechobee, Lake Kissimmee and WCAs variables imply the monthly average water
levels of those three water bodies. Data were obtained from DBHydro, an online
database that stores hydrological data provided by the SFWMD (2019a). Water stages
ranged between 8.9 and 18.3 feet for Lake Okeechobee, 48 and 53 feet for Lake
Kissimmee and 11.2 and 15.5 feet for WCAs (see Table 3.2). Finally, Evaporation, which
represents average monthly evaporation, was also obtained from DBHydro (SFWMD,
2019a) and varied between 0.1 and 0.49 inches.
For the statistical analysis of the data, Stata 15 was used (StataCorp, 2017).
Before running the actual regression analysis, we tested the data for different types of
correlations, including cross-sectional dependence, heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. To test for cross-sectional dependence, we used the Breusch-Pagan LM
test in a fixed-effects linear model. The test rejected the null hypothesis of no existing
cross-sectional dependence, which means that our data show signs of cross-sectional
dependence. To test for heteroskedasticity, we used the LR test, which rejected the null
hypothesis of homoskedasticity. This result means that heteroskedasticity is present in
our dataset. Finally, we tested the data for autocorrelation using the Wooldridge test.
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The null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation was rejected which means that
autocorrelation is present.
3.3 Difference-in-Differences Approach
The idea of the DID approach is to compare the difference in outcomes of the
affected and unaffected groups, before and after a policy intervention to remove the
effect of the time trend and the pre-existing difference between the groups and isolate
the pure treatment effect (see Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6: Visualization of the Difference-in-Differences Approach
Adapted from: Columbia University (2019)

The DID estimate is measured by calculating the difference between the change
in the two outcomes before and after the treatment in the two different groups (treatment
and control), which is equal to the estimated regression coefficient on the interaction of
the dummy variable for a treatment group with the dummy variable for the aftertreatment period (Goodman-Bacon, 2019):
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡

(1)

With i and t signifying each group and period of time, 𝛽𝑖 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 stands for the treatment
group, 𝛽𝑡 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 stands for the post-treatment time period and 𝛽𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖 is the

interaction term of the two, revealing the effect of the treatment in the group that was
treated. In this way, an estimate of the “effect” of the treatment in the pre-treatment

period (when there is none) can be used to remove the effect of confounding factors that
might cause confusion when post-treatment outcomes of treated and non-treated groups
are compared (Lechner, 2010). Most real-life applications deviate from this basic setup
as a result of treatments starting at different times (Goodman-Bacon, 2019).
In the setup of the current study there is not one single group treated with OWRs
and another group without any OWRs (see Figure 3.6). Instead, all counties
implemented different phases of OWRs at different times. To set up a clear distinction
between before and after the treatment, all periods when counties had OWRs in place
before November 2006 were removed from the data. Then, starting from the end of
2006/beginning of 2007, all counties had OWRs implemented continuously. Therefore,
instead of comparing a treatment group with a control group we compare groups of
counties with the same kind of OWR implemented. For instance, the group of counties
with OWRP_3, used as the treatment group, is compared to the other counties without
OWRP_3 as the control group. The advantage of the explained approach is its simplicity
and its potential to avoid endogeneity problems that usually occur when comparing
heterogeneous agents, which are counties in our case (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan,
2002).
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For the DID approach, a linear fixed-effects model is combined with the basic
DID regression model. The bare linear fixed-effects model looks like the following
(Allison, 2009):
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑧𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(2)

Since panel data are used, there is a set of individuals (i = 1, …, n), which are the

13 counties, each of whom has monthly data for 27 years (t = 1, …, T). In the above

equation, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable, which is Per capita water use. There are several
predictor variables, some of which vary over time. These are represented by the vector
𝑥𝑖𝑡 (Allison, 2009). A second set of predictor variables are those that do not vary over
time, represented by 𝑧𝑖 . The variable 𝜇𝑡 is an intercept that can vary between each

period, while 𝛽 and 𝛾 are vectors of coefficients. Furthermore, there are two error terms

𝛼𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , which behave differently from one another. While 𝜀𝑖𝑡 varies for each county in
every point in time, 𝛼𝑖 does only vary for each county but stays constant over time

(Allison, 2009). Therefore, 𝛼𝑖 represents the combined effect of all unobserved variables
constant over time, which is called individual heterogeneity (Brüderl & Ludwig, 2015) on
𝑦, while 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents variation at each point in time, that is purely random (Allison,

2009). The two terms can only be identified with panel data because person-specific
characteristics can only be assumed from repeated observations (Brüderl & Ludwig,
2015).
The advantage of fixed-effects regression models is that repeated observations
on individuals are used to control for unobserved and invariant characteristics that relate
not only to the outcomes but also to the explanatory variables (Angrist & Krueger, 1998).
Therefore, fixed-effects can be useful when causal inference is aimed for to provide
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unbiased estimates of causal effects if unobserved confounders might be present
(Gangl, 2010). To check for robustness, we ran three fixed-effects linear regression
models for each OWR, the first time controlling for variation between counties, the
second time expanded to control for variation between months through the inclusion of
monthly dummy variables, and the third time expanded to control for variation between
years through the inclusion of yearly dummy variables. To address the first-order
autocorrelation we decided to run an alternative fixed-effects linear model that
considered this kind of disturbance.
A third model was combined with the DID, called Generalized Estimation
Equation (GEE), which is similar to a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) because
it can include subject-specific random effects (Hong & Ottoboni, 2017). Unlike GLMM,
GEE does not require parametric assumptions (Hong & Ottoboni, 2017). Instead, the
within-subject covariance structure is estimated through averaging over all subjects
(Hong & Ottoboni, 2017). To describe the relationship between covariates and response,
GEE chooses iteratively the best β (Hong & Ottoboni, 2017). The GEE can estimate

population average effects and their standard errors (Hong & Ottoboni, 2017). To run the

model in Stata, a covariance needs to be specified. If no covariance is specified, the
default setting corresponds to the equal-correlation model (Stata Press, 2017). However,

β will be estimated consistently even if the chosen covariance structure does not match
(Hong & Ottoboni, 2017), though, wrong standard errors will be received, which can be
corrected by choosing the option of robust standard errors. The Huber/White/sandwich
estimator of variance is used to generate valid standard errors even though the within
group correlations deviate from the original hypothesis in the specified correlation
structure (Stata Press, 2017). The generalized linear model form looks as follows (Stata
Press, 2017 following Zeger & Liang (1986)):
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𝑔{𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡 )} = 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝛽,

𝑦 ~ 𝐹 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝜃𝑖𝑡

(3)

Where i = 1,…, m and t = 1,…, ni, with ni observations for each group’s identifier i.

The substitution of different definitions for g( ), which is the link function, and F, the

distributional family, results in various models (Stata Press, 2017). One example can be
if yit is normally distributed (Gaussian) and g( ) is the so called identity function, which
would have the following form (Stata Press, 2017 following Zeger & Liang (1986)):
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝛽,

𝑦 ~ 𝑁( )

(4)

This procedure yields a linear regression, a random-effects regression or other
such models, depending on what is assumed to be the correlation structure (Zeger &
Liang, 1986). Both of these models were used to analyze the effects of OWRP_2 and
OWRP_3 on Per capita water use.
Furthermore, we fit a panel-data linear model with feasible generalized least
squares for OWRP_3 as the main independent variable in the DID model. The basic
equation from which the model is developed can be written as (Stata Press, 2017):
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

(5)

Where i = 1,…,m is the number of panels (counties) and t = 1,…,Ti is the number

of observations for panel i (Stata Press, 2017). Basically, y can be written as an n by 1
vector of outcomes, x as an n by k matrix of predictors with 𝛽 being a k by 1 parameter

vector and 𝜖 as an n by 1 vector of unobserved error terms (Miller, 2017). Depending on
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the assumptions on the structure of the matrices, various models can be specified
(Miller, 2017).
3.4 Value Function Approach
The conceptual framework behind the value function approach aims to establish a
connection between a dollar value in the social system and a hydrological flow in the
natural/physical system. In the case of South Florida, the dollar value is the monetary
value of the estimated amount of water that is conserved by the residential water
consumers due to the OWRs. In other words, this dollar value is the saved money for the
customers who have a reduced water bill because they used less water due to the
restrictions. So, the first step connects a monetary value of the saved water with the
estimated saved amount of water caused by OWRs (see Figure 3.7). We derived the
volumetric amount of conserved water from the regression results of the DID approach
using the predicted amount, specific for OWRP_3. To obtain the respective monetary
value, we used available data from a South Florida water utilities rate study from 2018
that revealed an inflation rate of 5.7% per year (Beecher, 2016). This inflation rate is
much higher than the overall rate of inflation. For a simplified comparison, we calculated
the water rates in 2020 dollars. The utility with the highest and the lowest rates in each
county were used to calculate the respective cost for the amount of water not used. Most
utilities have an increasing block rate structure, which means that with increasing
consumption the price per 1,000 gallons of water increases. In the calculation process,
we considered the general average water consumption in every county and calculated
the price of the saved water in the respective tier in which the reduction occurred. In the
second step, the value function regression model enabled us to relate the OWRs to
several water use related variables in the regional hydrological system. More
specifically, the hydrological value function allowed to develop a relation between Lake
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Okeechobee water level and the Number of restricted days. The third step connects the
value of the conserved water from step one to the hydrological variable, namely Lake
Okeechobee water level, which is the main objective of this approach. Through the
intermediate step we could monetize a specific water flow in the hydrological system
based on how it relates to the implementation of OWRs, resulting in saved costs for
consumers.
Figure 3.7: Conceptual Framework
1. Value of water (saved money for customers) = F (Reduced use of
water due to OWRs)
•

Relationship between the water amount (static volume) saved due
to restrictions and the value of that water ($)

(The amount of OWR-related water savings, as estimated through DID
approach, is given its monetary value on the basis of counties’ utility rates.)

2. Outdoor water use restrictions (OWRs) = F (hydrological flow
(volume) at Lake Okeechobee, Lake Kissimmee and the WCAs)
•

Relationship between restrictions (OWRs) and water flow
(volume) in the hydrological system (Lake Okeechobee)

(Established through the estimation of the value function.)

3. Value of water (saved money due to reduced use of water) = F
(OWRs (hydrological flow))
•

Connecting $ value with the hydrological flow (volume)

(Computed monetary value of saved water (from step 1.) is connected to
water volume in hydrological system received from value function (from step
2.).)
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Especially for low counts like in our case (values of Number of restricted days
between 0 and 6), OLS regression is not the proper choice either. The traditional
negative binomial distribution is usually symbolized as NB2 (Cameron & Trivedi, 1986)
and derived from a so-called Poisson-gamma mixture distribution (Hilbe, 2011).
The negative binomial regression, which is a type of generalized linear model,
can be explained by the following parametrization, given by Hilbe (2011):
1
1
Г (𝑦 + )
𝛼
1
𝛼𝜇 𝑦
𝛼
𝑝(𝑦) = 𝑃(𝑌 = 𝑦) =
(
) (
) ,
1
1+𝛼𝜇
Г(𝑦 + 1)Г ( ) 1 + 𝛼 𝜇
𝛼

(6)

where μ > 0 is the mean of Y and α > 0 is the heterogeneity parameter. The

parametrization is derived as a Poisson-gamma mixture (Zwilling, 2013). The traditional
NB2 model is
ln 𝜇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥1 + 𝛽2 𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑝

(7)

While the predictor variables 𝑥1 , 𝑥2 , …, 𝑥𝑝 are given, the population regression

coefficients 𝛽0 , 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 , …, 𝛽𝑝 need to be estimated (Zwilling, 2013). When a random
sample with 𝑛 observations is given, the dependent variable 𝑦1 and the predictor

variables 𝑥1𝑖 , 𝑥2𝑖 , … , 𝑥𝑝𝑖 can be observed for subject 𝑖 (Zwilling, 2013). We can use vector
𝑇

and matrix notation, letting 𝛽 = (𝛽0 𝛽1 𝛽2 … 𝛽𝑝 ) , and then enter the predictor data into

the design matrix X as follows:
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1
1
𝑋=
⋮
1
(

𝑥11
𝑥21
⋮
𝑥𝑛1

𝑥12
𝑥22
⋮
𝑥𝑛2

…
…

⋯

𝑥1𝑝
𝑥2𝑝
⋮
𝑥𝑛𝑝

(8)
)

The 𝑖 𝑡ℎ row of X is designated as 𝑥𝑖 and (7) is exponentiated, so that the distribution (6)
can be written as

1⁄
𝛼

Г(𝑦𝑖 + 1⁄𝛼 )
1
𝑝(𝑦𝑖 ) =
(
)
Г(𝑦𝑖 + 1)Г(1⁄𝛼 ) 1 + 𝛼 𝑒 𝑥𝑖∙𝛽

𝛼 𝑒 𝑥𝑖 ∙𝛽
)
(
1 + 𝛼 𝑒 𝑥𝑖∙𝛽

𝑦𝑖

, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛.

(9)

Then, 𝛼 and 𝛽 are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation with the following
function (Zwilling, 2013):
𝑛

𝑛

1⁄
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𝛼
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1
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1
+
𝛼
𝑒
Г(𝑦
+
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𝑖
𝛼
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while the log-likelihood function looks like (Zwilling, 2013):
𝑛

1
ln 𝐿(𝛼, 𝛽) = ∑(𝑦𝑖 𝑙𝑛𝛼 + 𝑦𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 ∙ 𝛽) − (𝑦𝑖 + ) ln(1 + 𝛼𝑒 𝑥𝑖∙𝛽 )
𝛼
𝑖=1

(11)

1
1
+ 𝑙𝑛Г (𝑦𝑖 + ) − 𝑙𝑛Г(𝑦𝑖 + 1) − 𝑙𝑛Г ( ))
𝛼
𝛼

The maximum likelihood estimates are the values of 𝛼 and 𝛽 that maximize

𝑙𝑛𝐿(𝛼, 𝛽) (Zwilling, 2013). Furthermore, the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the
estimators is ∑ = −𝐻 −1, with H being the Hessian matrix of second derivatives of the

log-likelihood function (Zwilling, 2013). The variance-covariance matrix can be used to
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find the usual Wald confidence intervals and p-values of the coefficient estimates
(Zwilling, 2013).
The interpretation of coefficients resulting from count models, in our case a
negative binomial regression model, can be challenging since they are shown in logged
form (Meyer, 2020). Conveniently, the regression coefficients can also be reported in socalled incidence rate-ratios. Therefore, we ran the same regression again with having
the incidence rate-ratios displayed. Finally, we also applied a GLS model with population
average that we described in the previous section on the DID approach.
3.5 Comparison with Stated Preference Study
The stated preference discrete choice model, which was designed and
implemented by Seeteram (2014) as part of her Master thesis research (Seeteram,
2014; Seeteram, Engel, & Mozumder, 2018), provides the WTP of South Florida
residents to avoid OWRs. The study outline was extended, based on an earlier study by
Milon et al. (1999), that examined the valuation of ecosystem services provided by the
Everglades. Through an online survey, households in South Florida were provided with
important background information about different scenarios, which outlined management
and restoration alternatives with varying attributes for Lake Okeechobee, the Everglades
National Park and WCAs accompanied by certain OWRs. A set of 20 different choice
cards with hydrological variables was designed, combining different degrees of
protection or conservation with OWRs and a monetary fee based on which the
respondents had to make their choices. The respondents indicated their preferred
management plan and agreed on the corresponding cost for its implementation
(Seeteram et al., 2018). The study revealed that respondents in the general public stated
a marginal WTP value of US$25.70-32.40 (US$10.58-13.35 in 2004 dollar) per one unit
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OWR (equivalent to one day) per year to avoid both indoor and outdoor water use
restrictions on the household level (Seeteram, 2014). Furthermore, proenvironmentalists stated a marginal WTP of US$44.00 (US$18.14 in 2004 dollar) per
one unit OWR per year to avoid such restrictions (Seeteram et al., 2018). The average
WTP was US$58.00-87.00 (US$23.90-35.85 in 2004 dollar) per year (Seeteram, 2014).
Based on that, it was estimated that the South Florida population is willing to pay
between US$59.2-66.3 million (US$24.4-27.3 million in 2004 dollar) per year
(n=2,044,741 households) to avoid OWRs (Seeteram, 2014). The findings from the
stated preference study by Seeteram (2014), specifically the estimated WTP values for a
relaxation of OWRs, are compared to the revealed preference value of OWRs obtained
from the current study to find potential differences between stated and revealed
preferences among South Florida residents.
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4. RESULTS
4.1 Difference-in-Differences Approach
The results from the different DID regression models show varying effects of the
three different levels of OWRs. Table 4.1 gives an overview of the results of the fixedeffects regression that considered autocorrelation for all three types of OWRs, while
Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 show the regular fixed-effects regression results for each OWR
individually. These models controlled for variations on three levels, county, monthly and
yearly which we used as a robustness check.
The Interaction of OWRP_1 was not found significantly correlated to the
dependent variable, Per capita water use in our analysis. The fixed-effects linear
regression model that considered autocorrelation revealed a negative and insignificant
effect of OWRP_1 (-175.86) and a positive and insignificant effect of the Interaction
(79.29) (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Fixed-effects Linear Regression Results Considering Autocorrelation for All
Three Outdoor Water Use Restrictions1
VARIABLES
R-SQ
CONS
OWRS
TREATMENT2007
INTERACTION
MEDIAN
HOUSEHOLD
INCOME
BACHELOR’S
DEGREE OR
HIGHER
1*

MODEL 1 (OWRP_1)
0.2424
3573.93***
-175.86
-1,102.71***
79.29
0.03**

MODEL 2 (OWRP_2)
0.2433
3444.26***
-476.20***
-1,234.87***
463.03***
0.03***

MODEL 3 (OWRP_3)
0.2451
3550.58***
-969.86***
-1,177.06***
917.83***
0.03***

57.54**

61.65***

55.43**

indicates significance at 0.10; ** indicates significance at 0.05; *** indicates significance at 0.01

The regular fixed-effects regression model on the other hand revealed a positive
correlation of OWRP_1 with Per capita water use, significant at the 10% level (Model 1:
501.47; Model 2: 478.17; Model 3: 483.52). The Interaction_1 was found to be
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negatively and insignificantly correlated to Per capita water use (Model 1: -197.29;
Model 2: -181.44) (see Table 4.2). The coefficients of Treatment2007, Median
household income and Bachelor or higher are all significant at the 1% level and very
similar in Models 1 and 2 of the regular fixed-effect linear regression (see Table 4.2).
Treatment2007 has a coefficient between -980 and -985, Median household income has
a coefficient of 0.017 and Bachelor’s degree or higher has a coefficient of -42. In Model
2, monthly dummy variables are included with September removed as the reference
month since that month had the lowest usage on average. One can see that all
coefficients of the other months are significantly and positively correlated with Per capita
water use (between 205.57 for February and 869.64 for May). Model 3 deviates from the
other two Models in that the constant is negative (-1,277.744), Treatment2007 is
negative (-484.89), Interactoion_1 is positive (60.299) and the coefficients of Median
household income (0.16) and Bachelor or higher (-72.47) are much greater (see Table
4.2). The monthly dummy variables have very similar coefficients. For the included
yearly dummy variables, Year_12 was removed beforehand for being the year with the
lowest average Per capita water use and served therefore as the reference year.
Furthermore, the regression dropped Year_06 due to collinearity. From Year_85 until
Year_05 the coefficient is significant and positive implying that per capita water use was
steadily decreasing for those two decades (from Year_85: 3,687.95; to Year_05:
884.83).
Table 4.2: Fixed-effects Linear Regression Output for Outdoor Water Use Restriction
Phase 1 Under Different Control2
VARIABLES
CONTROLLED FOR

MODEL 1
County variance

R-SQ
CONS
OWRP_1

0.0004
5,773.51***
501.47*

MODEL 2
County and monthly
variance
0.0028
5,345.49***
478.17*
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MODEL 3
County, monthly and
yearly variance
0.3004
-1,277.744***
483.52*

TREATMENT2007
INTERACTION_1
MEDIAN
HOUSEHOLD
INCOME
BACHELOR OR
HIGHER
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
YEAR_85
YEAR_86
YEAR_87
YEAR_88
YEAR_89
YEAR_90
YEAR_91
YEAR_92
YEAR_93
YEAR_94
YEAR_95
YEAR_96
YEAR_97
YEAR_98
YEAR_99
YEAR_00
YEAR_01
YEAR_02
YEAR_03
YEAR_04
YEAR_05
YEAR_06
YEAR_07
YEAR_08
YEAR_09
YEAR_10
YEAR_11
YEAR_12
2*

-985.29***
-197.29
0.017***

-980.59***
-181.44
0.017***

-484.89***
60.299
0.16***

-42.25***

-42.37***

-72.47***

514.36***
205.57***
823.29***
680.36***
869.64***
270.53***
310.94***
323.09***
removed
381.04***
472.76***
555.77***

517.01***
208.52***
825.94***
680.73***
870.77***
269.06***
310.94***
323.09***
removed
386.32***
488.59***
571.12***
3,687.95***
3,674.36***
3,453.83***
3,354.899***
3,193.94***
2,881.48***
2,562.63***
2,515.79***
2,360.95***
2,123.45***
1,754.63***
1,923.83***
1,684.3***
1,725.61***
1,739.91***
1,365.698***
1,147.16***
1,233.13***
1,070.74***
1,076.86***
884.83***
Omitted
-330.63***
-95.9
335.01***
118.74
23.42
removed

indicates significance at 0.10; ** indicates significance at 0.05; *** indicates significance at 0.01

Three different regression models were applied to test the DID approach with
OWRP_2 as the main treatment variable. Model 2 in Table 4.1 shows the results of a
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fixed-effects linear model considering autocorrelation. The coefficients are all significant
with values of about -476 for OWRP_2, -1,235 for Treatment2007, 463 for the
Interaction_2, 0.03 for Median household income and about 62 for Bachelor’s degree or
higher. Compared to this, Table 4.3 shows the results of the fixed-effects linear
regression with increasing control. In Model 1, two of the main variables, OWRP_2 and
Interaction_2 with values of -168 and -132, respectively, were not significantly correlated
to Per capita water use (see Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Fixed-effects Linear Regression Results for Outdoor Water Use Restriction
Phase 2 Under Different Control3
VARIABLES
CONTROLLED

MODEL 1
County variance
0.0000
5,730.93***
-167.72
-719.25***
-131.81
0.017***

MODEL 2
County and monthly
variance
0.0052
5,305.12***
-191.25*
-735.91***
-78.79
0.016***

MODEL 3
County, monthly and
yearly variance
0.2969
-1,347.43
-22.42
1.97
-356.89***
0.017***

R-SQ
CONS
OWRP_2
TREATMENT2007
INTERACTION_2
MEDIAN
HOUSEHOLD
INCOME
BACHELOR OR
HIGHER
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
YEAR_85
YEAR_86
YEAR_87
YEAR_88
YEAR_89
YEAR_90
YEAR_91
YEAR_92
YEAR_93
YEAR_94

-38.23***

-38.37***

-74.92***

502.06***
193.56***
811.82***
671.64***
869.18***
269.88***
310.94***
323.09***
removed
380.25***
475.95***
566.03***

499.44***
190.95***
809.54***
669.36***
870.61***
268.91***
310.94***
323.09***
Removed
384.96***
487.83***
574.98***
3,734.74***
3,718.07***
3,494.46***
3,392.45***
3,229.67***
2,908.31***
2,592.62***
2,543.58***
2,386.54***
2,146.85***

51

1,775.83***
1,942.84***
1,701.10***
1,740.22***
1,755.42***
1,411.83***
1,155.54***
1,246.55***
1,083.80***
1,082.91***
890.14***
Omitted
-470.03***
-315.23***
230.34**
118.93
23.32
removed

YEAR_95
YEAR_96
YEAR_97
YEAR_98
YEAR_99
YEAR_00
YEAR_01
YEAR_02
YEAR_03
YEAR_04
YEAR_05
YEAR_06
YEAR_07
YEAR_08
YEAR_09
YEAR_10
YEAR_11
YEAR_12
3*

indicates significance at 0.10; ** indicates significance at 0.05; *** indicates significance at 0.01

Treatment2007, Median household income and Bachelor’s degree or higher were
all significant with values of -719, 0.017 and -38, respectively. Results of Model 2
including monthly variance are mostly comparable concerning the levels of significance
and actual values. The coefficient of OWRP_2 increased to -191 and shows a 10% level
significance while the coefficient of Interaction_2 decreased to -79 (see Table 4.3).
Regarding the monthly dummy variables, September was again set as the reference
category removed due to having the lowest Per capita water use on average. All
remaining months are significantly and positively correlated to Per capita water use
(between 193.56 in February and 869.18 in May). Model 3, considering county, monthly
and yearly variation, greatly deviates from the other two models. The constant is not
significant anymore and negative (-1,347.43), the coefficient of OWRP_2 is much
smaller (-22.42), the coefficient of Treatment2007 is slightly positive and insignificant
(1.97) and the coefficient of Interaction_2 is significantly correlated to Per capita water
use (-356.89) (see Table 4.3). What remained very similar are Median household
income (0.017) and the coefficients of the monthly variables. With regard to the yearly
dummy variables, Year_12 was removed beforehand due to having the smallest average
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Per capita water use (used as reference category), Year_06 was dropped due to
collinearity and from Year_85 to Year_05 all of the coefficients are positive and
significant (from Year_85: 3,734.74; to Year_05: 890.14).
Finally, a population-averaged linear model with robust standard errors was
applied (see Table 4.4). Overall, these results are very similar to Model 1 of the fixedeffects linear models with OWRP_2 (-171.513) and Interaction_2 (-128.996) being
negatively but not significantly correlated to Per capita water use. Median household
income (0.016) and Bachelor’s degree or higher (-34.539) do not have a significant
correlation with Per capita water use like in the fixed-effects models, leaving only
Treatment2007 being significantly and negatively correlated to Per capita water use (723.12).
Table 4.4: Regression Results for Outdoor Water Use Restriction Phase 2 (2 Days per
Week Watering Allowed), Dependent Variable Per Capita Water Use5
VARIABLES
CONS
OWRP_2
TREATMENT2007
INTERACTION_2
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME
BACHELOR’S DEGREE OR HIGHER
5*

MODEL (POPULATION-AVERAGED WITH
ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS)
5735.708***
-171.513
-723.12***
-128.996
0.016
-34.539

indicates significance at 0.10; ** indicates significance at 0.05; *** indicates significance at 0.01

For the DID approach using OWRP_3 as the main treatment variable, we applied
four different regression models: Model 3 of Table 4.1 shows results of a fixed-effects
linear regression considering autocorrelation, Model 1 to 3 in Table 4.5 show results of a
fixed-effects linear regression model that includes an increasing number of control
variables for county, county plus monthly and county plus monthly plus yearly variation.
Finally, Table 4.6 displays the results of a feasible generalized least squares (Model 1)
and a population-averaged model (Model 2).

53

The fixed-effects linear regression considering autocorrelation (Table 4.1, Model
3) shows significant results for all included variables. OWRP_3 has a coefficient of
almost -970, Treatment2007 of -1,177, the respective Interaction of almost 918, Median
household income of 0.03 and Bachelor’s degree or higher of about 55 (see Table 4.1).
Compared to this, the results from the regular fixed-effects linear regression models
show great differences for all variables. In Table 4.5, Model 1, showing results after
controlling for county variation, and Model 2, showing results for county plus monthly
variation, are very similar.
Table 4.5: Fixed-effects Linear Regression Results for Outdoor Water Use Restriction
Phase 3 Under Different Control6
VARIABLES
CONTROLLED

MODEL 1
County variance
0.0006
5,790.27***
-2,230.99***
-889.24***
2,207.04***
0.017***

MODEL 2
County and monthly
variance
0.0022
5,360.33***
-2,307.697***
-881.296***
2,174.71***
0.017***

MODEL 3
County, monthly and
yearly variance
0.2692
-1,282.24***
-1,590.89***
-171.93
1,467.51***
0.17***

R-SQ
CONS
OWRP_3
TREATMENT2007
INTERACTION_3
MEDIAN
HOUSEHOLD
INCOME
BACHELOR OR
HIGHER
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
YEAR_85
YEAR_86
YEAR_87
YEAR_88
YEAR_89
YEAR_90
YEAR_91
YEAR_92

-43.09***

-44.10***

-85.87***

519.71***
211.21***
828.63***
687.64***
871.898***
272.68***
310.94***
323.09***
Removed
379.73***
485.01***
572.33***

521.84***
213.34***
830.76***
689.82***
874.38***
272.65***
310.94***
323.09***
removed
385.17***
496.34***
583.21***
3,715.45***
3,695.95***
3,469.51***
3,364.67***
3,198.72***
2,882.434***
2,559.35***
2,509.21***
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2,351.06***
2,110.27***
1,738.15***
1,904.05***
1,661.21***
1,699.22***
1,713.32***
1,369.73***
1,116.86***
1,206.82***
1,044.67***
1,039.64***
849.32***
Omitted
-674.27***
-427.47***
-11.48
118.61
22.52***
removed

YEAR_93
YEAR_94
YEAR_95
YEAR_96
YEAR_97
YEAR_98
YEAR_99
YEAR_00
YEAR_01
YEAR_02
YEAR_03
YEAR_04
YEAR_05
YEAR_06
YEAR_07
YEAR_08
YEAR_09
YEAR_10
YEAR_11
YEAR_12
6*

indicates significance at 0.10; ** indicates significance at 0.05; *** indicates significance at 0.01

In Model 1, OWRP_3 has a coefficient of about -2,231, Treatment2007 of about 889 and Interaction_3 of 2,207, compared to Model 2 with a coefficient of OWRP_3 of 2,308, Treatment2007 of -881 and Interaction_3 of 2,175 (see Table 4.5). In both
models, the coefficient of Median household income is 0.017 and the coefficient of
Bachelor’s degree or higher is about -44. The included monthly dummy variables show,
just like in the previous two cases, all positive and significant coefficients after
September was removed as the reference month (between 211.21 for February and
871.898 for May). Again, Model 3 controlling for county, monthly and yearly variance,
deviates from the other two models. The constant is not positive but has a significant
coefficient of -1,282, OWRP_3 has a significant coefficient of almost -1,591,
Treatment2007 is not significant with about -172, and the Interaction is significant with
almost 1,468. Median household income received the same value (0.17) while the
coefficient of Bachelor’s degree or higher decreased to about -86. The coefficients for
the monthly variables are very similar, while the yearly variables are significantly and
positively correlated from Year_85 to Year_05 with Year_12 removed as the reference
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category and Year_06 dropped for collinearity (from Year_85: 3,715.45; to Year_05:
849.32).
Table 4.6: Regression Results for Outdoor Water Use Restriction Phase 3 (1 Day per
Week Watering Allowed), Dependent Variable Per Capita Water Use7
VARIABLES

CONS
OWRP_3
TREATMENT2007
INTERACTION_3
MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD
INCOME
BACHELOR’S DEGREE OR
HIGHER
7*

MODEL 1 (FEASIBLE
GENERALIZED LEAST
SQUARES, ITERATED)
3935.099***
-1498.603**
-1260.147***
1555.516**
-0.009**

MODEL 2 (POPULATIONAVERAGED)

109.458***

-39.396***

5795.216***
-2226.074***
-893.567***
2206.097***
0.016***

indicates significance at 0.10; ** indicates significance at 0.05; *** indicates significance at 0.01

The remaining two models in Table 4.6 show results of a feasible generalized
least squares model and of a population-averaged model. In Model 1, all variables are
significant with the coefficient of OWRP_3 having a value of about -1,489,
Treatment2007 of about 1,260, Interaction_3 of about 1,556, Median household income
of -0.009 and Bachelor’s degree or higher of around 109. Model 2 on the other hand
resulted in coefficient values very similar to the fixed-effects linear regression Model 1
and 2 in Table 4.5, all being significant.
Based on Model 2 of the regular fixed-effect linear regression models (see Table
4.2, 4.3 and 4.5) and on the results of the fixed-effects linear regression considering
autocorrelation (see Table 4.1), we predicted the marginal effects for all three OWRs.
This is basically the predicted average Per capita water use per month considering the
effect of different variables (see Figure 4.7). Despite different regression outputs, one
can see that the results of most of the variables are no more than a few hundred gallons
apart from each other. A closer look at the results of the model that considers
autocorrelation, one can see an average Per capita water use of just around 5,700
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gallons when neither Treatment2007 nor OWR is active (see 0 0). When Treatment2007
is active, referring to all counties in the period between 2007 to 2012, the predicted
average Per capita use is between 4,500 and 4,600 gallons per month (see 0 1). Under
active OWRs, the average predicted Per capita water use decreases with increasing
stringency of the restriction, with about 5,522 gallons under OWRP_1, about 5,255
gallons under OWRP_2 and about 4,739 gallons under OWRP_3 (see 1 0).
Table 4.7: Marginal Effects Based on Fixed-effects Linear Regression Results8
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE
CONSIDERING
AUTOCORRELATION
OWR
0
1
TREATMENT2007
0
1
OWR##TREATMENT2007
00
01
10
11
CONTROLLED FOR
COUNTY AND MONTHLY
VARIANCE
OWR
0
1
TREATMENT2007
0
1
OWR##TREATMENT2007
00
01
10
11
8*

MODEL 1
(OWRP_1)

MODEL 2
(OWRP_2)

MODEL 3
(OWRP_3)

5,439.91***
5,282.62***

5,442.48***
5,074.71***

5,432.89***
4,677.97***

5,684.64***
4,588.02***

5,653.38***
4,494.63***

5,694.94***
4,530.74***

5,698.14***
4,595.43***
5,522.28***
4,498.86***

5,731.66***
4,496.79***
5,255.45***
4,483.61***

5,708.53***
4,531.47***
4,738.67***
4,479.44***

5,372.65***
5,808.34***

5,438.94***
5,229.24***

5,400.03***
3,601.595***

5,639.1***
4,644.48***

5,579.83***
4,830.97***

5,574.08***
4,723.25***

5,602.28***
4,621.69***
6,080.46***
4,918.43***

5,611.27***
4,875.36***
5,420.02***
4,605.32***

5,606.41***
4,725.11***
3,298.71***
4,592.12***

indicates significance at 0.10; ** indicates significance at 0.05; *** indicates significance at 0.01

Finally, the exact treatment effect of each restriction is estimated when
Treatment2007 and OWRs are in effect simultaneously, showing that the predicted
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average Per capita water use for OWRP_1 would be almost 4,500 gallons, for OWRP_2
about 4,484 gallons and for OWRP_3 almost 4,480 gallons (see 1 1 in Table 4.7).
Looking at the margins based on the regular fixed-effects regression model, one
can see an average Per capita water use of just above 5,600 gallons when neither
Treatment2007 nor OWR is active (see 0 0) which is about 100 gallons less than
predicted with the other model. When Treatment2007 is active, referring to all counties in
the period between 2007 to 2012, the predicted average Per capita use varies between
almost 4,622 gallons for the OWRP_1 model and 4,875 gallons per month for the
OWRP_2 model (see 0 1). Under active OWRs, the average predicted Per capita water
use decreases steeply with increasing stringency of the restrictions, with about 6,080
gallons under OWRP_1, about 5,420 gallons under OWRP_2 and almost 3,300 gallons
under OWRP_3 (see 1 0). Finally, the exact treatment effect of each restriction is
calculated when Treatment2007 and OWRs are in effect simultaneously, showing that
the predicted average Per capita water use for OWRP_1 would be about 4,918 gallons,
for OWRP_2 about 4,605 gallons and for OWRP_3 almost 4,592 gallons (see 1 1).
These values are all below the individual values of both Treatment2007 and the
respective OWR (see Table 4.7).
Table 4.7 reveals that, looking at the model controlling for county and monthly
variance, about 133 gallons of water per person per month are saved under OWRP_3
(4,725.11 – 4,592.12) compared to the average of other OWRs. The savings due to
OWRP_3 compared to before the treatment period would be around 1,014 gallons per
person per month (5,606.41 – 4,592.12). We used both these numbers to calculate a
monthly monetary value for these amounts of water saved in each county. To
accomplish this, the most and the least expensive water rate structure in each county
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were used to calculate the average dollar value of the saved water in 2020 dollar. The
respective tier of water billing rate was considered, which means that we took into
consideration the average amount of water that was consumed per person in each
county despite the reduction of OWRP_3. For instance, if the price of the saved 133
gallons was calculated in the 3,000 to 5,000 gallons tier with a higher price per 1,000
gallons than it would have been in the 1,000 to 2,000 gallons tier. This is important to
obtain a realistic picture of the amount of Dollars saved (for the consumers) or forgone
(for the utilities). Those two values were then divided by two to obtain the average billing
rate. This procedure was followed for both amounts and all counties to find specific
values and extrapolated to receive the total monetary value of the saved amount of
water for the whole year. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the variation of water rates among
the 13 different counties considered here. Over the course of a year almost 1,600
gallons of water per person could be saved due to the OWRP_3, compared to the
average usage within the Treatment2007 period, whereas it would be almost 12,170
gallons per person compared to the pre-treatment average usage.
The water rates vary significantly between counties, leading to the different
monetary values for the 1,600 gallons of water saved (see Figure 4.1). Residents in
Orange could save the smallest amount of money (US$1) while some residents in
Broward could save most money with over US$13. The average value is US$4.90.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the monetary value of 12,170 gallons saved in one year. The saved
costs range between US$9.80 in Osceola and US$103.60 in Lee with an average value
of US$44.60.
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Figure 4.1: Monetary Value of Water Saved due to Outdoor Water Use
Restriction Phase 39

9 1,596

gallons per person per year, difference to consumption when less stringent restrictions are
implemented

Figure 4.2: Monetary Value of Water Saved due to Outdoor Water Use
Restriction Phase 310

10

12,168 gallons per person per year, difference to no restriction at all
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Furthermore, based on the regular fixed-effects linear regression model
considering county and monthly variations we predicted the specific amount of water that
could be saved in each month of implemented OWRP_3 compared to the overall
average usage (before and after treatment 2007). In Figure 4.3 one can see a significant
variation between the beginning and the end of the year.
Figure 4.3: Predicted Average Amount of Water Saved due to Outdoor Water Use
Restriction Phase 3 in Different Months11

11 no

values for July-October since Phase 3 restriction was never implemented in these months

For the four months between July to October, there were no such specific visible
savings since OWRP_3 was never in effect during these months in any given year. We
could estimate the values for January to April based on the data from eleven counties
(except Orange and Osceola county) and both May and June, and November and
December based on data from two counties only (Broward and Osceola for May-June,
Glades and Hendry for November-December). The results show that the comparatively
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smallest amount of water (about 700 gallons of water per person per month) was saved
when the majority of counties had to follow OWRP_3 in 2008 due to a districtwide
drought event, followed by the two months when only Broward and Palm Beach followed
this rule in 2007 with a reduction of about 1,000 gallons (see Figure 4.3). The greatest
savings were reached with over 1,600 gallons of water per person when OWRP_3 was
implemented in Collier and Hendry even earlier at the end of 2006.
In a next step we used the average monthly amount of water saved in all
counties (133 gallons) and the respective monetary values to extrapolate it to the entire
SFWMD level. In 2008, the entire district’s population was a little over 7.1 million people.
All of them together would have saved almost 11.4 billion gallons in an entire year due to
OWRP_3. The monetary value of this would equal more than US$42.2 million today.
These values were used in the analysis of the value function approach.
Finally, Figure 4.4 shows how Per capita water use varied across months
between 1985 to 2012. Across all 13 counties and 27 years, water use was
comparatively at its lowest in September, with an average amount of 5,360 gallons per
person. The month with the greatest average water consumption was May with an
average additional consumed amount of almost 900, bringing the overall average usage
up to 6,360 gallons per person. One can see a slow and steady increase of water use
from October to December. The water use remains almost stagnant from December
through January. February shows a significant drop in average water use. The average
consumption is substantially increased from March to May. And lastly, June through
August show another noticeable decrease in consumption (see Figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of Differences in General Water Use over Months

4.2 Value Function Approach
The regression models used for the value function show that certain hydrological
factors were significantly correlated to the dependent variable Number of restricted days,
while results for others were less obvious. Four different models were used to analyze
the relation between hydrological variables and the Number of restricted days: Model 1
is a fixed-effects negative binomial regression, Model 2 is a negative binomial
regression, reported as incidence-rate ratios, Model 3 is a population-averaged negative
binomial regression with robust standard errors and Model 4 is a population-averaged
negative binomial with robust standard errors and independent correlation (correlation
between time points is independent) (see Tables 4.8 and 4.9). These models show all
variables except WCA water level to be significantly correlated to the dependent variable
Number of restricted days. Temperature was excluded from the analysis due to
collinearity with Precipitation.
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Table 4.8: Regression Results for the Hydrological Model of OWRs, Dependent Variable
Number of Restricted Days12 (1)
VARIABLES

CON
PRECIPITATION
LAKE OKEECHOBEE
LAKE KISSIMMEE
EVAPORATION
WCA
12 *

MODEL 1 (FIXEDEFFECTS NEGATIVE
BINOMIAL)
-16.001***
-0.017**
-0.545***
0.412***
2.015***
0.053

MODEL 2 (NEGATIVE
BINOMIAL, REPORTED AS
INCIDENCE-RATE RATIOS)
-1.12e-07***
0.983**
0.5798***
1.51***
7.449***
1.054

indicates significance at 0.10; ** indicates significance at 0.05; *** indicates significance at 0.01

The coefficients’ signs are similar in all models and in Model 3 and Model 4 the
magnitude of the coefficients is also very similar. One can see that the Number of
restricted days increases with low Precipitation and low Lake Okeechobee water level
(coefficients -0.015/-0.017 for Precipitation and -0.55/-0.43/-0.45 for Lake Okeechobee).
The coefficients of Lake Kissimmee water level, Evaporation and WCA water level
increase with increasing Number of restricted days (0.41/0.36/0.37 for Lake Kissimmee;
2/1.8 for Evaporation and 0.053/0.024/0.027 for WCA). To better understand these
results, we had the fixed-effects negative binomial model reported as incidence-rate
ratios (see Table 4.8, Model 2). The incidence-rate ratios reveal that for a 1% increase
in Precipitation, we can expect a decrease in Number of restricted days by a factor of
0.98. For a 1% increase in the Lake Okeechobee water level, the Number of restricted
days decreases by a factor of 0.58. By contrast, for a 1% increase in the Lake
Kissimmee water level, the Number of restricted days increases by a factor of 1.51.
Finally, for a 1% increase in Evaporation and the WCA water level, we can expect an
increase in the Number of restricted days by a factor of 7.5 and 1.1, respectively.
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Table 4.9: Regression Results for the Hydrological Model of OWRs, Dependent Variable
Number of Restricted Days13 (2)
VARIABLES

MODEL 3
(POPULATIONAVERAGED AS
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL
AND WITH ROBUST
STANDARD ERRORS)

CON
PRECIPITATION
LAKE OKEECHOBEE
LAKE KISSIMMEE
EVAPORATION
WCA

-12.608***
-0.015**
-0.432***
0.359***
1.787***
0.024

13 *

MODEL 4 (POPULATIONAVERAGED AS NEGATIVE
BINOMIAL AND WITH
ROBUST STANDARD
ERRORS AND
INDEPENDENT
CORRELATION)
13.3295***
-0.017*
-0.448***
0.374***
1.816***
0.027

indicates significance at 0.10; ** indicates significance at 0.05; *** indicates significance at 0.01

Based on the relation between Lake Okeechobee water level and Number of
restricted days established in these regression models, we can apply the framework
developed in Figure 3.7. The first step is to connect a monetary value with the amount of
water that is saved due to OWRP_3, which is possible with the DID regression model
outputs. Based on those results, we can predict how much water would be saved in a
year for each county and then extrapolate it to almost 11.4 billion gallons (133 gal x 12
months x 7.1 million people) for the entire population of the SFWMD. A monetary value
for the saved amount of water could be calculated for each county and extrapolated,
revealing a total of more than US$42.2 million (US$21.7 million in 2008 dollar) for the
entire SFWMD. Then we can use the relation established between the OWRs and the
hydrological system. In this model, the dependent variable is not Per capita water use
but Number of restricted days. As explained before, the incidence-rate ratios reveal that
for a 1% increase of the Lake Okeechobee water level the Number of restricted days in
a week can be expected to decrease by a factor of 0.58, which means that if the lakes’
water level falls by 1% we can expect that we will have almost half an additional day of
water use restriction. Furthermore, we calculated the exact reductions of the Lake
Okeechobee water level that correspond to an increasing Number of restricted days (see
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Figure 4.5), then illustrated the relation in percent (see Figure 4.6) and finally
transformed it into a volume that is related to different OWRs (see Figure 4.7).
Figure 4.5: Water Level of Lake Okeechobee in Relation to Number of Restricted Days

Figure 4.5 shows that the predicted average water level of Lake Okeechobee is 14.7 feet
when there are no restrictions implemented. The orange points indicate the values
based on actual data. Since there is no such OWR restricting outdoor water usage to
six, five or four days or less than once a week, the blue values were interpolated.
Decreasing water level in Lake Okeechobee is related to an increasing Number of
restricted days, reaching an average 13.4 feet at 4 restricted days which is equivalent to
OWRP_1, 12.4 feet at 5 restricted days which is equivalent to OWRP_2 and a low of
10.4 feet at 6 restricted days which is equivalent to OWRP_3.
Figure 4.6 shows, similar to Figure 4.5, the relationship between the water level
change of Lake Okeechobee and the Number of restricted days, but now in percentage
of water level. Setting the average water level when there are no restrictions as 100%
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(14.7 feet), we calculated that an OWRP_1 is associated with a 9% drop of Lake
Okeechobee water level. A 15% decrease is related to OWRP_2 and a much greater
29% decrease is related to the implementation of OWRP_3.
Figure 4.6: Percentage Change of Lake Okeechobee’s Water Level in Relation to
Number of Restricted Days14

14 14.7

feet set as 100%

Using the average lake surface area of Lake Okeechobee of 467,000 acres, we
convert the water levels in feet into corresponding lake volumes in acre-feet (U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, 2008). Our model predicts that no restrictions occur around a
volume of 6.9 million acre-feet in Lake Okeechobee (see Figure 4.7). Based on our
results, we can expect OWRP_1 coincides with a volume of around 6.2 million acre-feet,
OWRP_2 coincides with a volume of about 5.8 million acre-feet and OWRP_3 coincides
with a volume of around 4.9 million acre-feet, a very significant decrease of 29%.
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Figure 4.7: Percentage Change in Volume of Lake Okeechobee in Relation to Number of
Restricted Days

The last step is to connect the monetary value from the water saved due to
OWRP_3 with the water in the hydrological system. We calculated the monetary value of
the water saved due to OWRP_3, which implies that the volume of water that decreased
in the hydrological system, more specifically in Lake Okeechobee, can be assigned to a
monetary value. Therefore, a decrease of Lake Okeechobee of almost 0.9 million acrefeet can be assigned a monetary value of more than US$42.2 million (US$21.7 million in
2008 dollar). Here we took the difference between the average volume related to
OWRP_2 and the average volume related to OWRP_3 (5.8 – 4.9million acre-feet) in
Lake Okeechobee.
Furthermore, it was also possible to calculate the average water levels of Lake
Okeechobee over the course of the year between 1985 to 2012. One can see a variation
between wet season, from May to October, and dry season from November to April.
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Higher lake levels of above 14 feet are normal from September to March and lower lake
levels from April to August (see Figure 4.8). Based on this seasonal variation in Lake
Okeechobee water level, the probability of having OWRs in place also varies.
Figure 4.8: Average Monthly Water Level of Lake Okeechobee 1985-2012

Finally, Figure 4.9 shows the difference between the Lake Okeechobee water
levels in the dry and wet season. In the wet season, signified by the blue dots, the
maximum average water level (which is around 13 feet) coincided with three days of
restriction. In general, actual water restrictions are related to smaller decreases in Lake
Okeechobee water levels, for instance a 10% reduction of water level leads to OWRP_2.
Compared to that, the 100% Lake Okeechobee average water level of the dry season,
indicated by the orange dots, is related to one day of restriction and a 20% reduction in
water level is associated with OWRP_2 (see Figure 4.9).
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Figure 4.9: Relation of Lake Okeechobee’s Seasonal Lake Levels to Number of
Restricted Days

4.3 Comparison with Stated Preference Results
The study by Seteeram et al. (2018) reported that the stated WTP values of
survey respondents ranges between US$25.70-32.40 (US$10.58-13.35 in 2004 dollars)
per unit OWR to avoid restrictions, while the average WTP is US$58.00-87.00
(US$23.90-35.85 in 2004 dollars) per year (Seeteram, 2014). Based on these numbers,
it was estimated that the South Florida population was willing to pay between US$59.266.3 million (US$24.4-27.3 million in 2004 dollars) (n=2,044,741 households) to avoid
OWRs (Seeteram, 2014). The monetary value that we received from the DID regression
was between US$25.8-54.4 million (in 2020 dollars), based on the lowest and highest
water utility rate in each county. Therefore, the stated WTP is about US$5-40.5 million
higher than the monetary value we calculated for the saved water. It is important to
understand that the WTP results from Seeteram et al. (2018) are related to the marginal
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WTP, for one unit decrease of restriction. This means going from OWRP_3 to OWRP_2,
one additional day of irrigation is allowed. In the current study, the monetary value
relates to a similar unit since we calculated the reduced amount of water due to
OWRP_3, and its monetary value, compared to the average usage from 2007 to 2012, a
time period when all counties had OWRP_1 or OWRP_2 implemented.
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
5.1 Discussion
5.1.1 Difference-in-Differences Approach
Overall, we were not able to establish a causal relation in the DID analysis
between OWRP_1 and a decrease of Per capita water use. Neither the pure OWRP_1
nor the treatment effect expressed by the Interaction_1 were significantly correlated (at
the 0.01 levels) to Per capita water use in any of the applied models. This might result
from OWRP_1 being the least strict OWR mechanism. In the phase after 2007, there
was no month or county without any implemented restrictions. Therefore, OWRP_1
allowed the comparatively highest water consumption for outdoor use. As a
consequence, it is not surprising that no reducing effect of this type of restriction could
be found.
In contrast, it was possible to establish a causal relation in the DID analysis
between OWRP_2 and Per capita water use, however only in the fixed-effects linear
regression model that considered autocorrelation. The other models delivered
insignificant results for both OWRP_2 and Interaction_2. The results of the fixed-effects
linear regression model considering autocorrelation revealed that OWRP_2 is correlated
to a decrease of Per capita water use of about 476 gallons per month, while the
Interaction_2 is positively correlated. To understand this, it is necessary to consider
Treatment2007, which is also negatively correlated to Per capita water use, revealing a
reduced water consumption of 1,235 gallons per month in the period after 2007
compared to the average usage before 2007. What is most interesting in the context of
the DID approach though is the effect of the Interaction_2, which can be better
understood when looking at the margins. They reveal the actual amount of water used
under different treatments. The predicted marginal effects calculated after the fixed-
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effects linear regression considering autocorrelation show an average water
consumption under the influence of Interaction_2 of almost 4,484 gallons per person per
month. Compared to the average usage in the post-treatment period, which is almost
4,497 gallons, a small amount of 13 gallons are saved. Looking at the predicted margins
calculated after the fixed-effects linear regression controlling for county and monthly
correlation, the savings appear to be much bigger. With an average usage of about
4,605 gallons per person per month under Interaction_2 and an average consumption of
about 4,875 gallons in the post-treatment period, a reduction of 270 gallons per person
per month could be calculated. Although these results are not congruent, it is possible to
draw a few conclusions. Due to the partly insignificant results received, it is not possible
to state with entire certainty that a specific reducing effect of this restriction on Per capita
water use is proven. The margins have predicted a reducing effect of 13 and 270
gallons, respectively, depending on the model used. Since 13 gallons have been
predicted by the fixed-effects linear regression model with autocorrelation and it has
delivered significant results beforehand, one could argue that at least 13 gallons have
been saved due to OWRP_2 compared to OWRP_1. This is a relatively small reduction
resulting from one additional day of OWR. On the other hand, with OWRP_1 as the
baseline after 2007 one could argue, that the overall Per capita water use was already
reduced so much due to only three-days watering allowed that an additional restricted
day did not have a major impact on the average water consumption. On a large scale,
permitted watering on two or three days a week may not have had such an influential
effect on how and when residents used water outside since most of them may only water
twice per week with restrictions present.
The DID approach applied with OWRP_3 as the major independent variable
unanimously established a causal relation between the most stringent type of restriction
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and Per capita water use, revealing a significant and decreasing effect in the regular
fixed-effects linear regression model and in the model considering autocorrelation. More
importantly, the Interaction_3 is found to be significant. The predicted margins illustrate
that the restriction in the period from 2007 to 2012 led to an average reduction of Per
capita water use of 51 (considering autocorrelation) or 133 (considering county and
monthly variation) gallons per person per month, depending on the model. OWRP_3
was only ever implemented for a comparatively short time, a few months, and these
periods were drought periods with residents following OWRs nonstop and increased
efforts to raise awareness. The results indicate a success of these efforts with residents
adjusting their behavior.
Overall, a causal effect of the implemented OWRs could only be clearly shown
for OWRP_3. However, this does not mean that there is none for OWRP_2 and
OWRP_1. Instead, limitations of the data could have caused non-significance of the
coefficients to weaken the results. Besides that, potential reasons for non-compliance or
constrained compliance exist as explained in the literature review, such as consumers
not being aware of the more stringent restriction, residents being in a dilemma between
following OWRs or homeowner association rules or customers changing the water use in
a strategic way that only shifts the amount used for watering from one day to the other.
The actual reasons for certain types of water consumption behavior will remain unclear
in the current study based on aggregate data.
The other two explanatory variables in the DID models, Median household
income and Bachelor’s degree or higher showed interesting and mostly matching
results. Median household income revealed to be highly significantly and positively
correlated to Per capita water use (0.017) in the majority of models. This indicates that
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households with a higher income tend to use more water than those with a lower
income. This is not surprising and corresponds to findings from previous studies
(Fielding, Russell, Spinks, & Mankad, 2012; Gregory & Di Leo, 2003; Harlan, Yabiku,
Larsen, & Brazel, 2009). As explained in the literature review, a higher income allows
customers to maintain a certain affluent lifestyle with more water-consuming fixtures like
additional bathrooms and bathtubs in the house, bigger yards and pools. Compared to
this, the second variable, Bachelor’s degree or higher was significantly correlated with
Per capita water use but sometimes negatively and sometimes positively, depending on
the model. The value of the coefficient ranged between -38 (in the fixed-effects linear
regression model controlling for county and monthly variation with OWRP_2 as the main
predictor variable) and -44 (for the models with OWRP_1 and OWRP_3). In the fixedeffects linear regression controlling for autocorrelation, the value of this coefficient was
positive and between 55 to 62, making the effect of this variable inconsistent. In previous
studies, both increasing and decreasing correlations between water use and education
have been observed. On the one hand it can be argued that an increased level of
education can advance knowledge and thus increase awareness of issues such as
water scarcity and its impacts, translating it into reduced water consumption (Dean,
Lindsay, Fielding, & Smith, 2016). On the other hand, higher personal water
consumption can be related to showing off ones socioeconomic status when better
education, leading to higher income, is associated with affluence, which can again
manifest in a bigger house and garden with additional indoor and outdoor water
appliances (Dean et al., 2016). Another influential factor might be political identity,
related to increased or decreased awareness of environmental issues. The inconsistent
finding on the effect of education reveals the complexity of such factors and indicates,
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that single variables and their interactions can be more difficult to understand than
assumed.
The variations between the predicted amounts of water saved in each given
month due to OWRP_3 compared to no restriction at all can reveal something about the
time when this restriction was implemented. When looking at the timeline of OWRs we
can see that Glades and Hendry were the first counties where OWRP_3 was
implemented, which was at the beginning of a two-year drought phase from November
2006 until March 2007. These two counties revealed the greatest water use reduction
with an average decrease of 1,600 gallons per person per month among all counties that
had this restriction implemented at any point in time compared to the overall average
usage. Broward and Palm Beach county followed in May/June 2007 with a smaller
reduction effect of about 1,000 gallons per person per month. By that time, people in
these two counties already followed OWRP_2 since the previous November, potentially
causing less responsiveness for the more stringent restriction. Finally, when all counties
except Orange and Osceola had OWRP_3 implemented from January to April 2008, the
resulting reductions were comparatively smaller (700 gallons per person per month)
compared to the overall average usage. After more than one year of drought with
respective restrictions and concomitant messaging, responsiveness might have come to
a lower level. Residents might have been desensitized by previous episodes of water
conservation and messaging. Besides the author’s personal observations, Whitcomb
(2005) stated that there is some evidence that residents may not be entirely following
OWRs. Similar to other water conservation regulations, such as required rain sensors on
automatic irrigation systems, weak enforcement can result in policy instruments that are
lacking in their effectiveness (Whitcomb, 2005). A similar finding was explained in a
study by Ozan & Alsharif (2013a), that investigated the effect of OWRs in Tampa,
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Florida. They found that water usage even increased with more stringent OWRs. Users
with more citations due to violations increased their consumption the most. Reasons
given by the authors included a possible discrepancy between local water use policies
including OWRs and homeowner association regulations. Furthermore, the simultaneity
of drought and OWRP_3 might have contradicted the homeowners’ constraint to keep
their lawn green (Ozan & Alsharif, 2013). In this context, landscaping advocates argue
that the actual water demand of turfgrass is not considered in the setup of OWRs, with
OWRP_3 resulting in most grasses being underwatered. Therefore, it would not make a
big difference to ban irrigation entirely at that point (Ozan & Alsharif, 2013).
Summarizing, DID with OWRP_3 was the only model that showed entirely
significant results in this analysis, while OWRP_2 revealed a significant treatment effect
only in one of the models, however, a stronger effect than resulting from OWRP_3.
The observed change in water use over months varies between an average of 5,360
gallons per person in September and 6,232 gallons per person in May over the entire
study period of 27 years and across all 13 counties. This variation is partly appearing
arbitrary and therefore difficult to interpret in a concise way. Broadly speaking, one could
argue that comparatively lower water consumption from June through October could
match with the rainy season in South Florida, when the weather is usually shaped by
greater amounts of precipitation. In the dry season between November to March, water
usage is slightly higher, potentially due to reduced amounts of precipitation. For April
and May, based on the climate graphs, the temperatures are usually already increasing
while the rain has not increased yet, requiring residents to balance the resulting need for
water. Another reason might be that more tourists and part-time residents visit during the
dry season, which is more likely given the more comfortable season in South Florida
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with lower temperatures and reduced likelihood of experiencing thunderstorms and
hurricanes. Furthermore, it is winter in the Northern hemisphere where many tourists
come from, leading to increased numbers of visitors that may be recognizable in the
counties’ water use.
Finally, the coefficients of the yearly dummy variables simply indicate that average Per
capita water use decreased over the course of the years compared to the last analyzed
year 2012 which had the lowest average Per capita water use. This can potentially be
related to general improvements in the water saving technologies of appliances and
increased awareness.
5.1.2 Value Function Approach
The hydrological variables used in the value function approach are in all four
regression models significantly correlated to the Number of restricted days. Number of
restricted days decreased with an increasing Precipitation. Since drier weather
conditions partly result from less precipitation, it seems logical that the Number of
restricted days increases the drier it becomes. The difficulty of including climate
variables such as temperature and precipitation is based in the potential multitude of
different aspects of such variables, such as daily maximum or average temperature,
number of rain events, average amount of rain or sum, which can all have varying
impacts on the results of an analysis. Lake Okeechobee water level is also negatively
correlated to Number of restricted days which means that when the lake’s water level
decreased, additional days of water restrictions were put ina place. Again, a decreasing
water level could be related to drought or drier conditions, triggering more stringent
water restrictions to be implemented. However, one must keep in mind that Lake
Okeechobee is not only impacted by the local weather but has also been managed
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under a complex management plan, letting water in from the Kissimmee Chain of Lakes
and out to the adjacent canals or WCAs to follow the various objectives, such as flood
control, navigation, water supply for agricultural irrigation, the Everglades National Park
and regional groundwater control (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2008). Therefore, a
direct causal relation between a decreasing water level (due to evaporation or water
allocation) in a drier climate and increasing restrictions is challenging. Lake Kissimmee
water level is positively correlated to Number of restricted days, which means that the
water level in the lake raised when OWRs became more stringent. At first sight, this
does not appear to be logical. It could potentially be explained, at least partly, with its
importance as nesting and foraging habitat for the Everglades snail kite that is focused
on in restoration plans in regards to Lake Kissimmee (Community Development
Department, 2015). Connected to targeted higher water levels that are closer to
historical stages, it is particularly mentioned that Lake Kissimmee is meant to serve as a
refuge for the snail kite during drought conditions in Lake Okeechobee (Community
Development Department, 2015; FWC, 1994). However, how strong the impact of this
management target is can only be assumed and for how long this management purpose
has already been followed could not exactly be determined. Evaporation is positively
correlated to Number of restricted days, as well, signifying that increased evaporation
(due to drier and/or hotter weather) was related to increasingly stringent OWRs, which
appears logical. Finally, WCAs water level is also positively but not significantly
correlated to Number of restricted days. Among other purposes, WCAs are, right after
Lake Okeechobee, the second most important source of water for irrigation during the
dry season and water is taken from them to increase canal and groundwater stages
(Abtew & Ciuca, 2016). Based on this information, a decreasing relation should have
been observed.
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Looking at the change of Lake Okeechobee water level and its relation to the
Number of restricted days, one can see that 14.7 feet, which was the overall average
water level of the analyzed period, equates to a volume of 6.9 million acre-feet (14.7 feet
x 467,000 acre, from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (2008)). Filled with this amount of
water, the probability of OWRs is very low. A drop of 9% to 6.2 million acre-feet, is the
average volume corresponding to OWRP_1, while OWRP_2 could be related to an
average volume of 5.8 million acre-feet. These volumes correspond to water levels of
13.4 and 12.4 feet (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2008), respectively, which are within
the boundaries that the lake’s water level is managed. Due to the nonstop
implementation of OWRP_1 and OWRP_2 since 2007, these values appear relatively
high for being related to the implementation of OWRs. In contrast, OWRP_3 occurs at
an average volume of 4.9 million acre-feet, which equates to a reduction of Lake
Okeechobee volume of 29%. In other words, almost a third of the lake’s average water
volume, corresponding to an amount of 2 million acre-feet, has either left the lake, been
used or evaporated, when OWRP_3 is implemented.
The last step of the framework is the connection of the water volume in the
hydrological system with the monetary value related to the water saved due to OWRP_3
in the human/social system. Therefore, we can assign a revealed preference value for
0.9 million acre-feet, which is the reduced lake volume going from OWRP_2 to
OWRP_3, to a sum of between US$25.8-54.4 million.
Before we continue to connect this revealed WTP value with the stated WTP, it is worth
noting that the Lake Okeechobee water level varies over the time of the year, as
mentioned before not only due to climate variables but also due to management
decisions. Therefore, the results show that the lake’s water levels have been much lower
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in the wet season to enable the storage of water when heavy rain events happen.
However, at the same time the probability for OWRs is theoretically much higher than it
is in the dry season. Already a 10% decrease of the Lake Okeechobee water level in the
dry season is related to OWRP_2, whereas the same restriction corresponds to an
almost 20% reduction of the average water level in the wet season. These findings
appear counterintuitive, but they are mostly the result of water management decisions.
5.1.3 Comparison with Stated Preference Study
The discrete choice analysis by Seeteram et al. (2018) found respondents’ stated
willingness to pay for a relaxation of OWRs. The current study used a DID and a value
function approach to find revealed preferences. The connection of these two studies
allows for a great opportunity to compare stated and revealed preference information for
outdoor water use from South Florida residents. In the current study, the monetary value
of the saved/restricted water due to OWRP_3 compared to less stringent restrictions
turned out to be between US$25.8-54.4 million for all South Florida residents for an
entire year. The stated WTP of respondents for using additional amounts of water, in
other words relaxing OWRs, was calculated to be US$59.2-66.3 million (US$24.4-27.3
million in 2004 dollars) for all South Florida households for a year (Seeteram, 2014).
This value relates to a one-unit step, for instance going from OWRP_3 to OWRP_2.
Therefore, it becomes clear that in this specific case the South Floridians’ stated WTP is
about between US$5-40.5 million higher than the estimated value of the water saved in
2008. This finding indicates that residents would be willing to pay more money for using
additional amounts of water. The monetary value that South Florida residents ascribe to
the water they saved seems to be higher than the rates they must pay for that water.
With regard to water conservation, the results indicate that higher water rates would be
necessary to achieve a reduction of water consumption via a price signal alone. If lower
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water rates are favored, OWRs can help to reduce the consumption. Besides that, while
the stated WTP in Seeteram et al. (2018) was set to be equal for every one-unit
decrease of OWRs, it is probable that varying amounts of water are saved due to
different OWRs. Therefore, to go from OWRP_2 to OWRP_1 (potentially a greater
difference in water use than between OWRP_3 and OWRP_2) may have a greater
monetary value and therefore cost the people more money.
5.2 Limitations
Within the scope of this graduate thesis research, data from 13 and 16 counties,
respectively, over the course of 27 years were analyzed. The data were provided by
employees of the SFWMD. Due to the type of water use data and the geographical and
time scale used to analyze the data, certain limitations exist concerning the validity of the
analysis. As briefly explained in the methods section, the study analysis is based on
public-supply water use data, which does not reveal clear information about the exact
amount of water used by a certain number of exclusively residential customers. The
number of people (permanently living in South Florida) served was known and regarding
OWRs, all kinds of customers need to follow these restrictions. However, the usage of
non-residential users that consume water on a bigger scale than individual households is
included in the data which warps the results on Per capita water use. Furthermore, the
number of tourists visiting South Florida every year cannot be considered due to lacking
information on the variation between counties, months and years. Therefore, the values
derived for Per capita water use are probably in general slightly too high in this study.
Additionally, data were used on the county level, which is a rather broad scale to
analyze water use data. Other studies used single household data provided by individual
water utilities. The advantage of our approach is that we were able to cover a greater
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area than an analysis on the household level that is likely to cover only a smaller number
of customers. Nonetheless, the disadvantage of the county level analysis is that in some
cases millions of people’s water use behavior is analyzed without being able to monitor
the individual user’s or neighborhood’s actions and motives. Similarly, weather data
were applied to entire counties, using precipitation and temperature from one single
weather station in the entire county. Especially in South Florida, where very local
weather events are common, such data can only be a proxy for areas farther away from
the measuring stations. This limitation applies also to educational attainment and
household income, which is always relating to the entire county, not able to show the
variability between residents within a county.
Concerning the focus of this analysis, the spatial and temporal variation could not
always be considered entirely. On the spatial scale, the analysis took place on the
county level, while restrictions were sometimes implemented on a regional scale (e.g.
Lower East Coast, Upper West Coast etc.) or even on a local scale (e.g. cities or certain
neighborhoods). On the temporal scale, while this analysis used months as the smallest
unit, OWRs were rarely implemented on the first of a given month and did sometimes
not last longer than two weeks. We tried to consider this variation as good as possible
but unavoidably, some of the details could not be modeled in the analysis. Therefore, the
observed effects of certain OWRs could not be estimated as accurately as I would have
hoped.
Another aspect that could not be considered was the usage of private irrigation wells
or reclaimed wastewater instead of potable water provided by the water utilities (Marella,
1992). This water can be used for most outside uses such as irrigation. Previous studies
on the density and frequency of such wells have shown that they were already within the
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thousands in the 1970s and 80s (Marella, 1992). Nonetheless, private irrigation wells are
neither permitted nor inventoried on a county level basis, and so information about them
is very limited while they are assumed to exist in substantial numbers (Marella, 1992).
Therefore, the existence of private irrigation wells might be one reason for confounding
the Per capita water use reduction of residential consumption, which cannot be isolated
without additional data that do not yet exist. Furthermore, following an informational
report from the SFWMD from 2014, several utilities have wastewater treatment facilities
and deliver the recycled water to residential irrigation purposes, for instance in Collier
county with over 18 million gallons per day sent to 20,000 residences and 23 golf
courses or Palm Beach county with 14 million gallons per day sent to 6,000 residences,
ten golf courses and two parks (SFWMD, 2014). Therefore, increasing use of reused
wastewater might be another invisible reason for reduced water consumption from
utilities over the years.
Additionally, other water management tools might have had impacts too. Local
retrofit programs and information campaigns have been implemented in South Florida
within the last decades and efforts to encourage the adoption of Florida-friendly
landscaping principles have increased as well, while their effectiveness was only partly
monitored. Some information exists only at the utility level and is therefore not readily
available (SFWMD, 2008). To reach out to all utilities within the borders of the SFWMD
to collect all information regarding conservation measures between 1985 to 2012 was
beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, their impacts might have had a masking
effect that was impossible to distinguish from the effects of the analyzed OWRs. Finally,
changing water rate structures, including not only increases but also switching from one
rate structure to another might have had an undetected impact, because, in the scope of
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this thesis, it was impossible to find almost 30 years of water rate information for all 93
utilities (those serving >2,000 people) within the SFWMD (SFWMD, 2017).
5.3 Concluding Remarks
In summary, the demand-side management policy tools are much cheaper than
supply-side measures and they help reduce pressure on the existing water supply.
Therefore, they are a more sustainable approach which is positive for the environment.
Overall, OWRs are a successful management approach in most cases, considering the
specific circumstances and the appropriate design of the restriction. However, it became
clear that it is important for local water supply managers to also take into account the
effort and resources required for the implementation of different measures. For instance,
OWRs call for information dissemination and at least a minimum of enforcement which
both have financial and political costs. Additionally, they need the users’ participation
and willingness to change behavior which is more difficult to exactly predict than many
other measures. Furthermore, the more specific the more effective any DSM tool can be.
That is why knowledge of certain characteristics about the target community is crucial,
such as neighborhood characteristics. On top of that, the expectations of the policy
should be stated clearly to be able to assess its success and reach its full conservation
potential. In this regard it is important to point out the possible advantages of
implementing an additional, consumption-steering price tool in combination with OWRs.
The advantage of prices is that the necessary infrastructure already exists, and no extra
staff or time is needed to monitor compliance while the consumers’ welfare is likely to
increase.
The main goal of this thesis was to perform an economic analysis of the OWRs in
South Florida to enable us to draw conclusions about the impacts of this type of
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demand-side management tool. Our approach consisted of three parts that built on each
other to provide a comprehensive assessment of the effects of this policy tool. Our
results have revealed varying conservation effects of the different OWRs which was not
surprising. While we could not establish a relation between the least stringent OWRP_1
and Per capita water use, this relationship was possible to establish between
OWRP_2/OWRP_3 and Per capita water use. Both restrictions were found to have a
decreasing effect on residential water consumption. Noteworthy is the finding that the
most stringent OWRP_3 did not lead to a similarly strong decrease of water
consumption like OWRP_2. Interference with other unobserved factors seem to have a
strong effect on residential water use as well.
The established connection between the water resource in the human and in the
natural system was insightful in the sense that it increased the understanding of how
variables on both sides cause reactions on each other. The theoretically established
relation between the water in Lake Okeechobee and OWRs in residential neighborhoods
could be developed and, despite a multitude of additional influential factors, simplifies
how these two variables are linked.
Regarding the monetary value of the water saved, the study could reveal a
disparity between the residents’ stated WTP to reduce the extent of restrictions and the
water’s actual monetary value. South Florida residents stated that they would be willing
to pay a much greater amount of money for relaxing the OWRs than the actual monetary
value of the water. This highlights the potential to change the current DSM tools in a way
that increases the customers’ welfare through access to increased amounts of water,
potentially connected to an increased water rate for greater amounts of consumption.
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Certain additional water access could be purchasable while the main target, to reduce
the overall consumption of water, would still be encouraged via the existing OWRs.
Finally, this analysis showed that the effect of a specific water management tool
is difficult to isolate, especially when the available data are only accessible on a broader
scale and additional information on other implemented measures or influencing factors is
lacking. Therefore, future research should focus on the interaction of multiple DSM
measures at the same time. Their potentially synergistical or additive effect is of
increased interest to water managers to achieve the sustainable water management
goals and objectives.
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APPENDIX

Comparison of studies on OWR concerning effectiveness, welfare outcome, WTP, Model/Method & Geography
(This list is not intended to be exhaustive)
Study

OWR Design

Effectiveness

(Shaw &
Maidment,
1988)

Voluntary and
mandatory lawn
irrigation, plant
irrigation every
few days
Voluntary &
mandatory

No effect for voluntary,
31% (every 10 days) to 39
%(never) reduction for
mandatory

(Shaw et el.,
1992)

Welfare impact

WTP

Model/Method

Geography
Texas, USA

Average 25% and 36%
reduction, respectively

Statistical model

Southern
CA, USA

Regression
analysis, predictive
regression model

Colorado,
USA

(Kenney,
Klein &
Clark, 2004)

Voluntary
mandatory

vs

4-12% reduction vs 18-56%
reduction,
respectively,
compared to “expected
use” (before restrictions)

(Halich
&
Stephenson,
2009)

Mandatory
&
voluntary
with
different levels of
information

(Ozan &
Alsharif,
2013)

From twice- to
once-a-week OWR

Reductions ranging from 07% for voluntary and 4-22%
for
mandatory
(with
increasing information &
enforcement
for
mandatory)
Increase 7.14%

USA

GIS mapping &
statistical data
analysis
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Tampa,
Florida

Study

OWR Design

Effectiveness

(Mini et al.,
2014)

Voluntary
restrictions;
Mandatory, limited
to 2 days per week
plus
increased
water rates

Model/Method

Geography

No savings for voluntary;
highest savings 19-23%
reduction for mandatory

Linear
mixedeffects regression
model

Los Angeles,
CA, USA

10% increase in price will
reduce aggregate water
demand by 1.6%; water
rationing/use restrictions
will reduce average
household demand by
19%/29%
Almost 30% of all savings,
10-20% outdoor water use
reduction

Econometric
model with price,
climate & water
demand equations

California,
USA

(Kenney et
al., 2008)

12% reduction

(Survis &
Root, 2012)

Overwatering occurred

Demand model as
function of
observable and
unobservable
variables, fixed
effects regression
Conservation
effectiveness ratio
(CER)

(Renwick &
Green,
2000)

(Loë et al.,
2001)

Welfare impact

WTP

Questionnaire
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Coloradon,
USA

Southeast
Florida, USA

Study

OWR Design

Effectiveness

(PérezUrdinales &
Baerenklau,
2020)

14-32% reduction

(Brennan et
al., 2007)

36% reduction under mild
restrictions, 42% during
complete sprinkler ban

(Grafton &
Ward, 2008)

14% decline in aggregate
water consumption

(Roibas,
GarciaValiñas, &
FernandezLlera, 2018)

Welfare impact

Net welfare cost
under complete
sprinkler ban
between $347 per
household when
time costs are low
to $871 when time
measured at full
wage rate
Positive Marshallian
surplus of price vs.
rationing $238 mil.,
$55 per person,
$150 per household
Varying from €1.68
for 2.5% reduction
to €31.83 for 15%
reduction
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WTP

Model/Method

Geography

Household
production theory
& stochastic
frontier analysis

California,
USA

Production model

Australia

Estimation of
demand,
calculation of
choke price &
Marshallian
surplus
Simulation analysis

Sydney,
Australia

Sevilla,
Spain

Study
(Woo, 1994)

OWR Design

Effectiveness

Welfare impact

WTP

Per capita
compensation
variation
(CV=amount of
additional money
needed to reach
initial utility after
price change)
estimate $221$1607 per month

(Griffin &
Mjelde,
2000)

$25.34-$34.39 to
avoid an occurrence
of water restrictions;
average
$9.76/month (1/4 of
water bill) to improve
future supply
security levels (in
1997 US-Dollars)
Additional $150/year
for more voluntary
management instead
of mandatory
restrictions
$11.67-16.92/month
(1993 US-Dollars) to
avoid restrictions of
varying severity

(Gordon et
al., 2001)

(Koss &
Sami
Khawaja,
2001)
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Model/Method

Geography

Model with utility
function, virtual
price, double log,
linear demand
function

Hong Kong

Contingent
valuation method

USA

Choice modeling
approach

Canberra,
Australia

Contingent
valuation method

California,
USA

Study

OWR Design

Effectiveness

Welfare impact

(Jenkins et
al., 2003)

US$ 1.6 billion per
year from water
scarcity

(de los
Angeles
Garcia
Valiñas,
2006)

Average losses
19.52€ (in 2001 €
per m3)

(Hensher,
Shore &
Train, 2006)

If restrictions >6
hours/day virtual
price three times
higher than real price

Lack WTP to avoid
most types of
restrictions; but up
to $239 (31.26%)
extra on water bill to
move from complete
sprinkler restrictions
every day all year
round to no
restrictions
Moving from one to
three-day sprinkler
use, 22% extra on
annual water bill

(Tapsuwan
et al., 2007)

(Cooper,
Burton, &
Crase, 2011)

WTP

$113-292,
depending on
individual income,
owning a lawn and
local water situation
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Model/Method

Geography

Loss function

California,
USA

Concept of
consumer surplus,
virtual prices,
generalized
method of
moments
Stated choice
experiment

Sevilla,
Spain

Choice
experiments

Perth,
Western
Australia

Multiple-bounded
discrete choice
contingent
valuation study

New South
Wales &
Victoria,
Australia

Canberra,
Australia

Study

(Mansur &
Olmstead,
2012)

(Buck et al.,
2016)

OWR Design

Effectiveness

Welfare impact

WTP

Model/Method

Geography

Gain of $96 per
household during
lawn
watering
season, 29% of
average
annual
household
expenditures
on
water
For 10/20/30%
reduction for single
family
$1,458/2,153/3,426
losses per acre-foot

To move from no
watering to two days
per week WTP of
$5.36 per thousand
gallons, instead of
$1.79

Usage of demand
estimates,
calculation of
shadow price, price
elasticity

11 North
American
cities

$64-633 for 10-30%
reduction per acrefoot

Econometric
model including
demand
estimation

California,
USA
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